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CONFLICTS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR PENSION
FIDUCIARIES IN THE ESG ENVIRONMENT
SUSAN N. GARY*
I. Introduction
Acting as prudent investors, pension managers must consider material
factors1 that affect the risk and return profile of funds. Material
environmental, social, and governance (“ESG”) factors may affect financial
performance by identifying opportunities and risks, so it would seem
prudent to consider those factors when making decisions in the best
interests of plan beneficiaries. As interest in ESG investing and funds
identified as ESG funds has grown,2 old questions about fiduciary duties
and ESG investing have surfaced.3
On June 30, 2020, the Department of Labor (“DOL”) issued a proposed
rule4 (“2020 Proposed Rule”) with the apparent goal of curtailing
consideration of ESG factors.5 The DOL then received a deluge of negative
comments from the financial industry, the pension industry, and
* Professor Emerita (formerly Orlando J. and Marian H. Hollis Professor of Law),
University of Oregon School of Law. Professor Gary received her B.A. from Yale College
and her J.D. from Columbia University. An earlier version of this Article was presented at
the 2021 Pension Research Council Virtual Symposium, April 30, 2021, and the author
thanks the discussant, John Sabelhaus of The Brookings Institution, and panelists Rob
Bauer, Luba Nikulina, and Gerben de Zwart. The author also thanks Keith Johnson and Jon
Lukomnik for sharing their knowledge and ideas on this topic and for instructive comments
on this Article. The editors at the Oklahoma Law Review provided thoughtful queries, as
well as technical edits, and the author greatly appreciates their efforts.
1. Prudence is defined by process because consideration of “all” financially material
factors is impossible, but a prudent investor makes an effort to consider known and
knowable factors.
2. See Quinn Curtis, Jill Fisch & Adriana Z. Robertson, Do ESG Mutual Funds Deliver
on Their Promises?, 120 MICH. L. REV. 393, 395 (2021) (“ESG investing—that is, investing
informed by environmental, social, and governance criteria or considerations—is growing
explosively.”); see also id. at 395 nn.2–7 (citing news articles discussing trends in ESG
investing).
3. Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, Reconciling Fiduciary Duty and Social
Conscience: The Law and Economics of ESG Investing by a Trustee, 72 STAN. L. REV. 381,
384–85 (2020).
4. Financial Factors in Selecting Plan Investments, 85 Fed. Reg. 39113 (proposed June
30, 2020).
5. See id. The 2020 Proposed Rule singled out ESG factors for additional
documentation. See infra Section IV.E.
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individuals, pointing out that compliance with the guidance would
adversely affect the financial interests of plan participants.6 The DOL
responded by walking back the proposed changes, issuing a final rule7
(“2020 Rule”) that, in most respects, reaffirms long-standing guidance on
investment duties in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(“ERISA”) context.8
After the inauguration of President Joe Biden in January 2021 and the
change in administration, the DOL announced that it would not enforce the
2020 Rule until it published further guidance.9 In May 2021, President
Biden directed the Secretary of Labor to consider rescinding the 2020 Rule
and to develop guidance addressing the effects of climate risk on pension
investments.10 On October 14, 2021, the DOL issued a proposed rule,
Prudence and Loyalty in Selecting Plan Investments and Exercising
Shareholder Rights (“2021 Proposed Rule”).11 The comment period ran for
sixty days,12 and at the time this Article is being written, the DOL is
considering hundreds of submitted comments. Direct guidance from the
DOL remains in flux, but the underlying duties of pension fiduciaries have
not changed. Pension fiduciaries should consider and evaluate investment
products and strategies based on current standards of prudent investment.
6. Final ERISA Rules Circle Back to Allow ESG Investing, REINHART BOERNER VAN
DEUREN (Nov. 17, 2020), https://www.reinhartlaw.com/knowledge/final-erisa-rules-circleback-to-allow-esg-investing; US SIF, Investor Organizations and Financial Industry Firms’
Analysis of Public Comments on Department of Labor ESG Proposal Shows Landslide of
Opposition, US SIF (Aug. 20, 2020, 1:11 PM), https://www.ussif.org/blog_home.asp?
display=148 [hereinafter US SIF, Investor Organizations and Financial Industry Firms’
Analysis of Public Comments].
7. Financial Factors in Selecting Plan Investments, 85 Fed. Reg. 72846 (Nov. 13,
2020) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 2509, 2550).
8. See id.
9. Emp. Benefits Sec. Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Labor, U.S. Department of Labor
Statement Regarding Enforcement of Its Final Rules on ESG Investments and Proxy Voting
by Employee Benefit Plans (Mar. 10, 2021), https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/ebsa/
laws-and-regulations/laws/erisa/statement-on-enforcement-of-final-rules-on-esg-investments
-and-proxy-voting.pdf [hereinafter Department of Labor Statement Regarding Enforcement
of Its Final Rules]; News Release, Emp. Benefits Sec. Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Labor, US
Department of Labor Releases Statement on Enforcement of Its Final Rules on ESG
Investments, Proxy Voting by Employee Benefit Plans (Mar. 10, 2021), https://www.
dol.gov/newsroom/releases/ebsa/ebsa20210310; see infra Section IV.F.
10. Exec. Order No. 14,030, 86 Fed. Reg. 27967 (May 20, 2021).
11. Prudence and Loyalty in Selecting Plan Investments and Exercising Shareholder
Rights, 86 Fed. Reg. 57272 (Oct. 14, 2021) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R pt. 2550).
12. Id.
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Prudent investors consider financially material information, including
financially material ESG factors.13
Part II of this Article describes the fiduciary duties, derived from the
statutory language of ERISA and from the common law of trusts, that apply
to pension managers.14 Part III briefly explains the history of social
investing and, based on that history, finds reasons for the continuing
suspicion that ESG investing necessitates a financial cost to the portfolio.15
Part IV of the Article then reviews and analyzes the DOL guidance on
fiduciary investing from 1994 through the present.16 Part V discusses
cautions and opportunities for pension fiduciaries under current legal rules
and guidance.17 The Article concludes by wondering whether a pension
fiduciary should consider plan participants’ interests beyond financial
interests.18
II. Fiduciary Duties for Pension Managers
Pension managers act as fiduciaries when they make decisions for the
funds they manage.19 Congress enacted ERISA in 1974 to provide
minimum standards for most pension plans operating in private industry,
and ERISA outlines fiduciary duties for plans governed by ERISA.20 State
law defines the fiduciary duties that apply to other pension plans.21
Fiduciary duties protect plan participants by constraining and guiding the

13. In the news release describing the 2021 Proposed Rule, Acting Assistant Secretary
for the Employee Benefits Security Administration Ali Khawar explained, “A principal idea
underlying the proposal is that climate change and other ESG factors can be financially
material and when they are, considering them will inevitably lead to better long-term riskadjusted returns, protecting the retirement savings of America’s workers.” News Release,
Emp. Benefits Sec. Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Labor, US Department of Labor Proposes Rule to
Remove Barriers to Considering Environmental, Social, Governance Factors in Plan
Management (Oct. 13, 2021), https://www.dol.gov/newsroom/releases/ebsa/ebsa20211013.
14. See infra Part II.
15. See infra Part III.
16. See infra Part IV.
17. See infra Part V.
18. See infra Part VI.
19. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 403, 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a).
20. See id. § 404, 29 U.S.C. § 1104.
21. See David H. Webber, The Use and Abuse of Labor’s Capital, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV.
2106, 2109–10 (2014) (describing state law application to public pension plans). This Article
focuses on ERISA’s articulation of fiduciary duties. As Webber points out, many state
pension laws adapt ERISA’s fiduciary standard. Id.
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managers in the choices they make for the plans. Understanding how
fiduciary duties apply to pension managers can alleviate some concerns
managers may have and can point to opportunities in investment strategies.
When Congress adopted ERISA in 1970, it adopted a trust standard for
pensions, stating that pensions are held “in trust.”22 Some differences in
terminology between ERISA and trust law exist, which have led to
confusion over the years.23 In general, however, the fiduciary duties that
apply to pensions can be understood by reference to trust law. Indeed, as
Professors Daniel Fischel and John Langbein have pointed out, “By
mandating the trust form and transposing the duty of loyalty to pension law,
the drafters of ERISA were able to institute a familiar regime to protect
pension funds against internal defalcation.”24 The Supreme Court has
confirmed that an ERISA fiduciary’s duty is “derived from the common
law of trusts.”25
A. Exclusive Benefit Rule Under ERISA–Duty of Loyalty Under Trust Law
In trust law, the duty of loyalty is the duty to act in the sole interest of the
beneficiaries whose interests the fiduciary serves.26 Rather than using the
term “duty of loyalty,” ERISA adopted what is referred to as the exclusive
benefit rule. The exclusive benefit rule is found in section 404(a)(1) of
ERISA:
[A] fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan
solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries and—
(A) for the exclusive purpose of:
(i) providing benefits
beneficiaries; and

to

participants

and

their

(ii) defraying reasonable expenses of administering the
plan;
(B) with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the
circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a
22. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 403, 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a).
23. Daniel Fischel & John H. Langbein, ERISA’s Fundamental Contradiction: The
Exclusive Benefit Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1105, 1107–10 (1988) (describing how elements
of trust law have been imported into ERISA law).
24. Id. at 1110.
25. Tibble v. Edison Int’l, 135 S. Ct. 1823, 1828 (2015).
26. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78 (AM. L. INST. 2007).
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like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the
conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims;
(C) by diversifying the investments of the plan so as to
minimize the risk of large losses, unless under the
circumstances it is clearly prudent not to do so; and
(D) in accordance with the documents and instruments
governing the plan insofar as such documents and instruments
are consistent with the provisions of this subchapter and
subchapter III.27
The purpose of the duty of loyalty—and of the exclusive benefit rule—is
to require the fiduciary to focus on the interests of the persons for whom the
fiduciary is investing and not on the fiduciary’s own personal interests.28
The duty of loyalty reflects the need to protect the persons for whom the
fiduciary is making decisions from the adverse consequences that could
result from fiduciary conflicts of interest and self-dealing.29 Because the
fiduciary is in a position to gain private benefit and has limited oversight,
the fiduciary duties developed to protect the trust’s beneficiaries.30
Although the focus of the duty of loyalty is on conflicts of interest, the duty
also prohibits the fiduciary from placing the fiduciary’s own interests or
preferences above those of the beneficiaries, even if the fiduciary will not
benefit financially.31
In the context of a pension, both the duty of loyalty and the exclusive
benefit rule mean that the fiduciary must focus on the interests of the plan
participants and their beneficiaries. Although “interests” and “benefits” are
not defined in ERISA or in trust law, in the pension context, they have been
interpreted to mean exclusively financial benefits.32 The 2020 Rule
continues to apply this interpretation of interests.33 A pension manager
cannot make investment choices that result in a financial cost to the plan,

27. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 404(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. §
1104(a)(1).
28. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78 cmt. b.
29. Id.
30. SUSAN GARY ET AL., BOGERT’S THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 543 (2022).
31. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78 cmt. f.
32. See, e.g., Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 134 S. Ct. 2459, 2468 (2014).
33. Financial Factors in Selecting Plan Investments, 85 Fed. Reg. 72846, 72884 (Nov.
13, 2020) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a1(c)).
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even if the choices bring other, non-financial benefits.34 While a private
investor might decide to take a lower financial return or more risk in
exchange for other benefits, a fiduciary investing pension funds cannot
make the same decision. Over the years, the DOL guidance has consistently
focused on financial risk and return, as discussed in Part IV below.
B. Duty of Care–The Prudent Investor Standard
At the time of ERISA’s enactment, modern portfolio theory had begun to
influence both investment strategies and the prudent investor standard in
trust law.35 ERISA’s direction that a fiduciary should diversify investments
to minimize risks reflects the influence of modern portfolio theory.36
Further, ERISA instructs the fiduciary to act “with the care, skill, prudence,
and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man
acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the
conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims.”37 This
guidance embraces the evolving nature of the prudence standard and has
allowed the ERISA standard, like the trust standard on which it is based, to
evolve.
The prudent man standard38 in trust law began as a conservative, assetby-asset analysis that limited financial risk and, by doing so, limited

34. Id.
35. Harry Markowitz published his explanation of modern portfolio theory in 1952,
arguing that a diversified portfolio in which an investor analyzed risk-return characteristics
across the portfolio rather than on an asset-by-asset basis could reduce overall risk.
Markowitz emphasized diversification as a way to manage risk. See Harry Markowitz,
Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FIN. 77 (1952); see also John H. Langbein, The Uniform Prudent
Investor Act and the Future of Trust Investing, 81 IOWA L. REV. 641, 642 (1996) (describing
the influence of modern portfolio theory on the development of the Uniform Prudent
Investor Act).
36. BEVIS LONGSTRETH, MODERN INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT AND THE PRUDENT MAN
RULE 33–35 (1987); Stephen P. Johnson, Note, Trustee Investment: The Prudent Person
Rule or Modern Portfolio Theory, You Make the Choice, 44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1175, 1184
(1993).
37. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 404(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. §
1104(a)(1)(B).
38. The prudent man standard became the prudent person standard and then the prudent
investor standard. See Langbein, supra note 35, at 645 (“As did the 1992 Restatement, the
Act takes the opportunity to unisex the prudent man, who has now become the prudent
investor.”).
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financial reward.39 That standard evolved to become the prudent investor
standard, which incorporated modern portfolio theory, and which has been
adopted by statute or case law throughout the country.40 A prudent person
making investment decisions for a pension plan today would follow the
circumstances prevailing now and not those in 1974. These circumstances,
in trust law and under ERISA, increasingly include an understanding of the
role material ESG factors can play in financial analysis.41
The prudent investor standard does not require particular types of
investments or particular investment strategies. A prudent investor looks at
industry norms and learns from what other prudent investors are doing.42 As
industry norms embrace the use of material ESG factors, not as a particular
investment strategy but rather as additional material information to use in
making investment decisions, attention on how pension fiduciaries should
consider ESG factors has increased.43 The 2020 Rule reflects this attention.
For pension fiduciaries, the underlying duty to act as a prudent investor,
in the interests of plan participants and their beneficiaries, has remained
constant. But as prudent investors use new information and new strategies
to improve results, the way to invest as a prudent investor would invest
continues to evolve. As the preamble to the 2020 Rule explains, “[T]he
Department did not intend the reference to ‘generally accepted investment
theoriesʼ to foreclose ERISA fiduciaries from considering emerging

39. Id. at 643–45; Susan N. Gary, Values and Value: University Endowments, Fiduciary
Duties, and ESG Investing, 42 J. COLL. & U.L. 247, 255–58 (2016) (describing the evolution
of the prudent investor standard in American trust law) [hereinafter Gary, Values and
Value].
40. UNIF. PRUDENT INV. ACT, Prefatory Note (UNIF. L. COMM’N 1994).
41. See Webber, supra note 21, at 2174–75.
42. See Langbein, supra note 35, at 654–61 (describing the future of trust investing by
discussing empirical evidence and other learning concerning modern portfolio theory, the
theory of efficient markets, international investing, derivatives, and other then-current
developments in thinking about investments).
43. For example, the Pension Research Council’s 2021 symposium focused on
sustainable investments in retirement plans. 2021 Online Symposium: Sustainable
Investment in Retirement Plans: Challenges and Opportunities, PENSION RSCH. COUNCIL:
WHARTON U. PA. (Apr. 29-30, 2021), https://pensionresearchcouncil.wharton.upenn.edu/20
21-online-symposium-sustainable-investment-in-retirement-plans/. Pensions & Investments
also published a white paper in connection with a webinar, “ESG: Focus on Climate
Change,” held on June 30, 2021. P&I Content Solutions, ESG: Climate Change: The
Inescapable Opportunity, PENSIONS & INVS. (June 28, 2021), https://www.pionline.com/
ESGclimateReport2021.
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theories regarding prudent investment practices or otherwise freeze
investment practice as of the date of the rule.”44
C. Duty of Impartiality
Although ERISA does not specifically call out the duty of impartiality, a
fiduciary managing a pension plan providing benefits to participants and
their beneficiaries must act impartially with respect to all participants and
beneficiaries and to others with interests in the plans. In 1988, Daniel
Fischel and John Langbein advocated incorporating the duty of impartiality
into any analysis of the fiduciary duties of pension plan managers.45 In
1996, the United States Supreme Court recognized that the duty of
impartiality applies to ERISA fiduciaries.46 The Court explained that, while
not always determinative, the common law of trusts informs an
interpretation of fiduciary duties under ERISA.47 The Court stated, “The
common law of trusts recognizes the need to preserve assets to satisfy
future, as well as present, claims and requires a trustee to take impartial
account of the interests of all beneficiaries.”48
The duty of impartiality is the duty to treat all the people to whom a
fiduciary owes duties fairly.49 A challenge in the ERISA context is that
ERISA’s exclusive benefit rule appears to extend only to the participants
and their beneficiaries, even though others may have interests in a plan’s
financial viability.50 Employers, as well as employees, may have an interest
in the plan; therefore, shareholders may be concerned about the
management of the plan.51 In a defined benefit plan, the participants will
receive their benefit regardless of the investment returns the plan generates,
so the employer’s shareholders bear the risk of underperformance.52 An
employer benefits if the pension benefits provided to workers reduce
employment costs, either because workers are willing to accept lower
44. Financial Factors in Selecting Plan Investments, 85 Fed. Reg. 72846, 72858 (Nov.
13, 2020) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 2509, 2550).
45. See Fischel & Langbein, supra note 23, at 1107.
46. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 514–15 (1996).
47. Id. at 497.
48. Id. at 514.
49. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 79 cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 2007).
50. See Fischel & Langbein, supra note 23; Alvin D. Lurie, ETIs: A Scheme for the
Rescue of City and Country with Pension Funds, 5 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 315, 332
(1996).
51. See Fischel & Langbein, supra note 23, at 1118, 1121–22.
52. Id. at 1121.
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salaries in exchange for benefits or because there is less worker turnover
due to worker satisfaction.53 Either way, investment results concern the
employer as well as the employees. In a defined contribution plan, the risk
is borne by the participants.54 But in either type of plan, the interests of the
participants will not all be the same. Differences exist between younger and
older workers, between participants who are currently employed and those
who are already retired, and between workers at different salary levels.55
In a pension, the duty of impartiality certainly extends both to
participants currently receiving benefits and to participants who will receive
distributions in the future. Plan administrators must be able to make current
distributions while safeguarding the plan’s overall viability to protect the
distributions that will be made many years later. Thus, the fiduciary’s duty
of impartiality is linked to the duty to act as a prudent investor. As the
Restatement of Trusts explains, to comply with the prudent investor
standard, the fiduciary must “conform to the fundamental fiduciary duties
of loyalty . . . and impartiality.”56 The fiduciary should evaluate long-term
risk to avoid shortchanging future distributees. Given the long-term nature
of pension plans, short-term thinking and short-term investment strategies
raise serious concerns.
Strategies maximizing short-term returns are tempting.57 Fund managers
may be rewarded based on quarterly returns, and business managers may be
compensated based on how the company is performing a year or a quarter
at a time. One might assume that future retirees will benefit from successive
short time horizons, but as economists James Hawley and Jon Lukomnik58
explain, “[T]he long-term is not simply additive short-term intervals, each
of which is unrelated to the previous and the next. Rather it is the linkages
of various past and current events to future ones.”59 Investments in each

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

See id. at 1118.
Id. at 1124–25.
Id. at 1120–22; Lurie, supra note 50, at 331.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90(c)(1) (AM. L. INST. 2007).
See generally JON LUKOMNIK & JAMES P. HAWLEY, MOVING BEYOND MODERN
PORTFOLIO THEORY 48 (2021).
58. James P. Hawley is Professor Emeritus School of Economics and Business
Administration, Saint Mary College of California, and Senior ESG Advisor, Truvalue Labs,
a Factset company. Id. at ix. Jon Lukomnik is managing partner of Sinclair Capital and a
Senior Fellow at the High Meadows Institute. Id.
59. Jim Hawley & Jon Lukomnik, The Long and Short of It: Are We Asking the Right
Questions? Modern Portfolio Theory and Time Horizons, 41 SEATTLE U.L. REV. 449, 472
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short-term period affect the next short-term period, and so on into the
future. If long-term systemic risk has consequences for investors,60
fiduciaries who ignore material long-term information may be violating
their duty to be prudent investors and their duty to act impartially.
D. Obedience
In a pension plan, the duty of obedience aligns with the duty to be a
prudent investor and the duty of loyalty.61 The purpose of a pension is to
provide distributions to participants when they retire. Acting in obedience
to that purpose means that the fiduciary must invest for the financial health
of the plan, including its long-term viability.
III. Historical Context for ESG Investing
A. Increasing Interest in ESG Investing
The 2020 Rule reflects an increasing interest in ESG investing and an
increasing pressure on pension managers to pay attention to ESG factors. 62
As discussed below, the DOL may have been influenced by concerns
voiced by some in the oil, gas, and coal industries that a focus on ESG
investing was hurting those industries.63 As originally proposed, the
guidance appeared to be an attempt to chill increased use of ESG factors.64
(2018) (explaining that modern portfolio theory has led to an increase in shorter investment
time frames).
60. See LUKOMNIK & HAWLEY, supra note 57, at 48–54 (describing short-termism and
the problems caused by short-termism in investing).
61. The duty of obedience is the duty to act in compliance with the terms of the trust,
and in the case of a pension it is the duty to act for the purposes of the pension. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 76 (AM. L. INST. 2007). The duty of obedience is also
the duty to comply with any laws that apply to the property being managed. Id.
62. Financial Factors in Selecting Plan Investments, 85 Fed. Reg. 72846, 72847 (Nov.
13, 2020) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 2509, 2550) (“Available research and data show a
steady upward trend in use of the term ‘ESG’ among institutional asset managers, an
increase in the array of ESG-focused investment vehicles available, a proliferation of ESG
metrics, services, and ratings offered by third-party service providers, and an increase in
asset flows into ESG funds. This trend has been underway for many years, but recent studies
indicate the trajectory is accelerating.”).
63. See infra text accompanying notes 155–57.
64. Industry observers noted that the 2020 Rule did, indeed, have a chilling effect after
it was announced. Brian Croce, DOL Working on Additional ESG, Lifetime Income
Guidance, Rules, PENSIONS & INVS. (Apr. 29, 2021, 2:13 PM), https://www.pionline.com/
regulation/dol-working-additional-esg-lifetime-income-guidance-rules (quoting Ali Khawar,
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To do so, the 2020 Proposed Rule relied on an unsubstantiated assumption
that using ESG factors would result in lower financial returns for the
pension plan.65 The comment letters from the finance industry countered
this assumption,66 but the idea that involving ESG information in any
investment vehicle will result in a financial cost to the product or plan
persists, despite evidence to the contrary. A brief look at the history of what
has been called “social investing” can help explain misconceptions about
ESG investing that affect fiduciaries.
Before turning to the history, it is also useful to note that any fiduciary
analysis of ESG investing faces a problem with terminology. In recognition
of this problem, the DOL said, in explaining the purpose for its 2020
regulatory action, that “use of terms such as ESG, impact investing,
sustainability, and non-financial performance metrics, among others,
encompass a wide variety of considerations without a common nexus and
can take on different meanings to different people.”67 Note that by lumping
these terms together, the DOL listed ESG with non-financial performance
metrics, creating further confusion around whether ESG factors are
financial or non-financial. Although in its explanations of the 2020 Rule the
DOL discusses ESG investing, in the 2020 Rule itself, the DOL uses the
terms “pecuniary” and “non-pecuniary” and avoids using the term ESG
altogether.68

acting assistant secretary for EBSA as saying that “the rules had a chilling effect on
investment behavior”); Alan Goforth, DOL Halts Enforcement of Final Rule on ESG
Investments, BENEFITSPRO (Mar. 10, 2021, 5:11 PM), https://www.benefitspro.com/2021/
03/10/labor-department-halts-enforcement-of-final-rules-on-esg-investments-proxy-votingby-employee-benefit-plans/?slreturn=20210606155446.
65. Financial Factors in Selecting Plan Investments, 85 Fed. Reg. 39113, 39115
(proposed June 30, 2020) (“Moreover, ESG funds often come with higher fees, because
additional investigation and monitoring are necessary to assess an investment from an ESG
perspective.”).
66. See Final ERISA Rules Circle Back to Allow ESG Investing, supra note 6; Jon
Lukomnik, Comment Letter on Proposed Regulation of ESG Standards in ERISA Plans, HARV.
L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (July 21, 2020), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/07/21/
comment-letter-on-proposed-regulation-of-esg-standards-in-erisa-plans/ (“For example, as of
July 5, 2020, [the] ACWI exchange traded fund, which tracks the ACWI equity index, had a
net expense ratio of 32 basis points. The CRBN exchange traded fund, which also tracks the
ACWI equity index but with a lower carbon footprint, had a net expense ratio of 20 basis
points. Both are part of Blackrock’s iShares family of ETFs.”).
67. Financial Factors in Selecting Plan Investments, 85 Fed. Reg. at 72847.
68. See id. at 72851.
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B. History of Social Investing
Investors have engaged in social investing—investing that considers
non-financial benefits in addition to financial benefits—for many years.69
An early example in the United States involved anti-slavery efforts by the
Quaker Philadelphia Yearly Meeting, which in 1758 prohibited members
from buying or selling humans.70 In the 1980s, social investing received
renewed attention in connection with the movement to divest from
companies doing business in South Africa, a divestment movement that
sought the abolition of South African apartheid.71 Over time, social
investing became known as socially responsible investing (“SRI”), and
many early forms of SRI used negative screens to remove categories of
stocks from a portfolio.72 For example, sin stocks—tobacco, firearms,
gambling, and alcohol—were, and still are, common screens.73

69. For an excellent explanation of the development of socially responsible investing
and the terminology used, see LAUREN CAPLAN ET AL., COMMONFUND INST., FROM SRI TO
ESG: THE CHANGING WORLD OF RESPONSIBLE INVESTING (Sept. 2013), and Susan N. Gary,
Best Interests in the Long Term: Fiduciary Duties and ESG Integration, 90 U. COLO. L. REV.
731, 736–47 (2019) (describing the history of socially responsible investing terminology)
[hereinafter Gary, Best Interests in the Long Term].
70. What Is Socially Responsible Investing? Definition and Meaning, MKT. BUS. NEWS,
https://marketbusinessnews.com/financial-glossary/socially-responsible-investing/ (last visited
June 22, 2022); Albert Feuer, Ethics, ESG, and ERISA: Ethical-Factor Investing of Savings
and Retirement Benefits, 47 TAX MGMT. COMP. PLAN. J. 212, 216 (2019); Benjamin J.
Richardson, Putting Ethics into Environmental Law: Fiduciary Duties for Ethical Investment,
46 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 243, 245 (2008).
71. See Joel C. Dobris, Arguments in Favor of Fiduciary Divestment of “South African”
Securities, 65 NEB. L. REV. 209 (1986); John H. Langbein & Richard A. Posner, Social
Investing and the Law of Trusts, 79 MICH. L. REV. 72, 72–73 (1980).
72. See Gary, Best Interests in the Long Term, supra note 69, at 737–40 (describing the
use of negative screens); SOC. INV. F., AFTER SOUTH AFRICA: THE STATE OF SOCIALLY
RESPONSIBLE INVESTING IN THE UNITED STATES (1995), https://perma.cc/95K3-CVNP
(describing issues addressed in early negative and positive screens) [hereinafter THE STATE
OF SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE INVESTING IN THE U.S.].
73. Lloyd Kurtz & Dan diBartolomeo, The Long-Term Performance of a Social
Investment Universe, J. INVESTING, Fall 2011, at 95, 96 (describing the methodology of the
KLD 400 and explaining that the KLD 400 excludes “[c]ompanies involved beyond specific
thresholds in alcohol, tobacco, firearms, gambling, nuclear power and military weapons”).
The 1995 Trends Report from the Social Investment Forum found that of managers using
screens, 86% avoided tobacco stocks, 73% avoided alcohol stocks, and 64% avoided
weapons stocks. See THE STATE OF SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE INVESTING IN THE U.S., supra
note 72, at 5.
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In the decades following the 1980s, different types of SRI strategies
developed as investors turned to best-in-class positive strategies focusing
on which companies or sectors to include rather than on which companies
or sectors to exclude.74 More recently, investors developed tools for using
ESG information about companies in making investment decisions.75
Although this Article sometimes uses the term ESG investing as a catch-all
for strategies that incorporate ESG information, no one ESG strategy or
type of ESG fund exists.
One strategy, which may be referred to as ESG integration, integrates
financially material ESG factors with more traditional financial metrics to
improve investment choices.76 As financial analysts realized that some ESG
information was material, they began to incorporate the information into
their analyses.77 ESG factors include information about such things as
product safety, workforce turnover, workplace protections for employees,
exposure to physical climate change risks, hazardous waste disposal
74. A best-in-class process looks for the “best” companies in an industry or sector, from
the standpoint of environmental or social factors. Rather than excluding a sector, a best-inclass selection process could include a sector that did not have the highest sustainability
ratings and select the companies within that sector that were doing the best in terms of
improving their environmental impact or providing good labor conditions for employees. See
RCM SUSTAINABILITY WHITE PAPER: SUSTAINABILITY: OPPORTUNITY OR OPPORTUNITY
COST? 2 (RCM Ltd., July 2011), https://www.msci.com/documents/10199/248121/11_10717
_RCMSWP_ET1907.pdf [https://perma.cc/B27R-8W5X] (describing the creation of a bestin-class portfolio).
75. RCM uses the term “sustainability investing,” and its definition matches the general
understanding of ESG investing: “Sustainability investing is broader than an ethically or
socially responsible investment strategy. Material environmental, social and governance
factors are considered alongside financial factors, identifying risks and opportunities that
have not been fully priced in by the markets thus supporting enhanced stock selection and
providing RCM with an information advantage.” Id. at 14; see also CAPLAN ET AL., supra
note 69 (explaining that, in contrast with early SRI, “ESG analysis takes a broader view,
examining whether environmental, social and governance issues may be material to a
company’s performance, and therefore to the investment performance of a long-term
portfolio”); ASSET MGMT. WORKING GRP., UNEP FIN. INITIATIVE & MERCER, DEMYSTIFYING
RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT PERFORMANCE: A REVIEW OF KEY ACADEMIC AND BROKER
RESEARCH ON ESG FACTORS 60 (2007), http://www.unepfi.org/fileadmin/documents/Demys
tifyingResponsibleInvestmentPerformance01.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y24H-44KW] (defining
corporate social responsibility).
76. See Gary, Best Interests in the Long Term, supra note 69, at 745–47 (describing
ESG integration).
77. Mozaffar Khan et al., Corporate Sustainability: First Evidence on Materiality, 91
ACCT. REV. 1697, 1697 n.1 (2016).
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practices, and board member engagement and skills.78 A company’s
behavior with respect to any of these factors may be financially material,
but the information may not be included in financial statements. By
expanding beyond traditional financial analysis, ESG integration provided
analysts with more information about opportunities and risks.79 As analysts
and investors began to realize the financial impacts of such information,
ESG investing ideas moved into the mainstream.80 Some investors use ESG
information for both financial and non-financial purposes, and some
investors use ESG investing solely for financial reasons.81
C. Cost to the Portfolio
The idea that ESG investing is one more form of SRI has led to
persistent assumptions that the use of ESG factors will result in a cost to the
portfolio.82 The explanations for these assumptions lie in the history of SRI,
outlined above. Negative screens were seen as reducing diversification, an
important component of modern portfolio theory.83 Although fund
managers adjusted the portfolios to compensate for sectors that were
removed,84 the idea that any negative screen would result in a cost to the
portfolio persisted.85 Dylan Minor created a study of SRI and non-SRI
78. See Gary, Best Interests in the Long Term, supra note 69, at 746; Final ERISA Rules
Circle Back to Allow ESG Investing, supra note 6.
79. See generally ROBERT G. ECCLES & MIRTHA D. KASTRAPELI, THE INVESTING
ENLIGHTENMENT: HOW PRINCIPLE AND PRAGMATISM CAN CREATE SUSTAINABLE VALUE
THROUGH ESG 8 (2017), http://www.statestreet.com/content/dam/statestreet/documents/
Articles/The_Investing_Enlightenment.pdf [https://perma.cc/GB53-ZM8H] (addressing the
misconception that ESG integration requires financial returns to be sacrificed).
80. See US SIF, Investor Organizations and Financial Industry Firms’ Analysis of
Public Comments, supra note 6.
81. See ECCLES & KASTRAPELI, supra note 79, at 12.
82. See, e.g., Jon Hale, Does Sustainable Investing Help or Hurt Returns?,
MORNINGSTAR (Dec. 7, 2017), http://news.morningstar.com/articlenet/article.aspx?id=839
607 [https://perma.cc/F5JL-RRMH] (describing the continuing “misimpression” that
sustainable investing will hurt returns).
83. See Gary, Best Interests in the Long Term, supra note 69, at 748–50; Langbein,
supra note 35, at 646–50.
84. See Adam M. Kanzer, Exposing False Claims About Socially Responsible Investing:
A Response to Adler and Kritzman, ADVISOR PERSPS. (June 4, 2013), https://www.
advisorperspectives.com/articles/2013/06/04/exposing-false-claims-about-socially-respon
sible-investing-a-response-to-adler-and-kritzman [https://perma.cc/6JTX-TQDU].
85. Mark Kritzman and Timothy Adler used a Monte Carlo simulation to show that if a
manager randomly removed a percentage of stocks from a portfolio, the portfolio would
suffer a financial cost. Id. They then argued that an SRI fund using a screen related to fossil
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funds to prove the hypothesis that “while there may be no net total cost
(i.e., financial and social costs and benefits) with SRI, according to
fundamental economic principles, there must be a net financial cost to
SRI.”86 To his surprise, Minor found no statistically significant difference
between the funds.87
A second concern about any SRI strategy is that the administrative costs
of identifying companies to include or exclude will be excessive. The DOL
expressed this concern in the purpose statement of the 2020 Rule, stating
that “ESG funds often come with higher fees, because additional
investigation and monitoring are necessary to assess an investment from an
ESG perspective.”88 While it is true that there is a difference in fees
between actively managed funds and passive funds, that difference is not
specific to funds that integrate ESG factors. As Langbein and Posner noted
in 1980, any managed fund will have fees that exceed the administrative
expenses in passive funds.89 After expressing skepticism “that a portfolio
constructed in accordance with consistent, and consistently applied, social
principles could avoid serious underdiversification,”90 they concluded “that
a social-investing portfolio will probably have the same expected return as
a standard investment portfolio (of the same systematic risk),”91 but with
higher administrative costs as compared to a passive fund.92 They added
that a social investing fund “need not generate higher administrative costs

fuels would bear that cost. Timothy Adler & Mark Kritzman, The Cost of Socially
Responsible Investing, 35 J. PORTFOLIO MGMT. 52 (2008). See generally DANIEL R. FISCHEL,
FOSSIL FUEL DIVESTMENT: A COSTLY AND INEFFECTIVE INVESTMENT STRATEGY 6–11 (2017),
http://divestmentfacts.com/pdf/Fischel_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/966W-ZZ3R] (finding,
after a study commissioned and financed by the Independent Petroleum Association of
America, a potential diversification cost for fossil fuel divestment by focusing on divestment
from the “energy sector” as a whole); Langbein & Posner, supra note 71, at 85 (“[S]tocks
are added to and subtracted from the portfolio by the social investor without regard to the
effect on diversification.”).
86. See Dylan B. Minor, Finding the [Financial] Cost of Socially Responsible Investing,
J. INVESTING, Fall 2007, at 54.
87. Id. at 66.
88. Financial Factors in Selecting Plan Investments, 85 Fed. Reg. 72846, 72848 (Nov.
13, 2020) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 2509, 2550).
89. See Langbein & Posner, supra note 71, at 82–83.
90. Id. at 88.
91. Id. at 93.
92. Id.
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than an investment strategy that involves research and active trading.”93 An
empirical study published in 2021 by Quinn Curtis, Jill Fisch, and Adriana
Robertson addressed the question of costs, as well as other concerns about
ESG investing.94 The professors identified and analyzed “ESG funds”95 and
concluded that “ESG funds do not appear to be charging investors higher
fees or sacrificing returns relative to their traditional counterparts.”96
D. ESG Integration and the Prudent Investor Standard
A prudent investor reviews current information about investment
strategies and considers information being used by financial analysts and
other investors.97 Studies that compare actively managed funds using a
variety of SRI strategies with actively managed funds that do not indicate
the use of any form of SRI have shown predominantly neutral or better
results, especially for funds using ESG integration.98 The studies are
93. Id. Langbein and Posner’s concerns over a fiduciary’s use of what they called social
investing was tied to their view that fiduciaries should invest in passive rather than actively
managed funds. In 1988, funds engaged in social investing were necessarily actively
managed; passive ESG funds have developed more recently. Langbein and Posner describe
social investing as involving active engagement in securities analysis because the analysts
must consider the ESG information. Id. In 2022, ESG mutual funds, index funds, and
exchange-traded funds (“ETFs”) are available. Rob Berger, The Best ESG Funds of June
2022, FORBES ADVISOR (June 1, 2022, 1:17 AM), https://www.forbes.com/advisor/investing/
best-esg-funds/.
94. See Curtis, Fisch & Robertson, supra note 2.
95. Id. at 395. The authors identified ESG funds in two ways: (i) by screening fund
names for keywords like “esg,” “impact,” and “responsible” and then hand checking the
funds to confirm an ESG connotation; and (ii) by using the Morningstar list of ESG funds.
Id. at 419, 419 n.140. Their analysis then examined the extent to which the identified ESG
funds invest in companies with higher ESG ratings, the voting patterns of ESG and non-ESG
funds, and the pecuniary costs and pecuniary performances of ESG and non-ESG funds. Id.
at 423–42.
96. Id. at 450.
97. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §§ 90–92 (AM. LAW INST. 2007).
For the history of the prudent investor rule, see GARY ET AL., supra note 30, § 613, and
Langbein, supra note 35, at 643–45 (describing the history and development of the prudence
standard prior to the Uniform Prudent Investor Act).
98. See, e.g., Curtis, Fisch & Robertson, supra note 2; TENSIE WHELAN ET AL.,
ROCKEFELLER ASSET MGMT. & NYU STERN CTR. FOR SUSTAINABLE BUS., ESG AND
FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE: UNCOVERING THE RELATIONSHIP BY AGGREGATING EVIDENCE
FROM 1,000 PLUS STUDIES PUBLISHED BETWEEN 2015 – 2020 (2020), https://www.stern.
nyu.edu/sites/default/files/assets/documents/NYU-RAM_ESG-Paper_2021%20Rev_0.pdf.
For descriptions of studies analyzing funds using different types of SRI strategies, see Gary,
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important for a prudent investor to consider, both because they counter the
myths of a “necessary cost” with ESG investing when actively managed
funds are compared with other actively managed funds, and because they
suggest that investors may obtain financial benefits or reduced risk by using
ESG integration.99 As more passive investments using ESG factors are
developed, passive investments are also available.100
As an example of the increasing use of ESG information, the CFA
Institute reported that in 2020, 85% of CFA Institute members reported
taking E, S, or G factors into consideration, an increase from 73% in
2017.101 Studies have shown that funds using ESG integration achieved
improved returns on a risk-adjusted basis, especially when analyzed over a
longer time period.102 One of the comment letters submitted to the DOL
describes some of the results:
One meta review of approximately 2200 studies of corporate
performance found that 63% of them associated better ESG
performance with higher value creation (only 8% had negative
findings). Other studies suggest that high performing ESG
companies create value disproportionate to their peers: “ESG
links to cash flow in five important ways: (1) facilitating top-line
growth, (2) reducing costs, (3) minimizing regulatory and legal
interventions, (4) increasing employee productivity, and (5)
optimizing investment and capital expenditures,” according to a
study published in the November 2019 McKinsey Quarterly.103

Values and Value, supra note 39, at 281–90, and Gary, Best Interests in the Long Term,
supra note 69, at 747–66.
99. The Curtis et al. study is important in this regard given the comprehensiveness of
the study. See Curtis, Fisch & Robertson, supra note 2.
100. See id. at 395 (“Morningstar reports that both the number of ESG-focused index
funds and the total amount of assets held by such funds have doubled in the past three
years.”).
101. CFA INST., FUTURE OF SUSTAINABILITY IN INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT: FROM IDEAS
TO REALITY 13 (2020), https://www.cfainstitute.org/-/media/documents/survey/future-ofsustainability.ashx.
102. See Lukomnik, supra note 66 (discussing the results of a study published in the
November 2019 McKinsey Quarterly).
103. Id. The letter was informed by and signed by thirty people with “experience and
expertise relating to retirement savings.” Id. The letter lists academic affiliations, numbers of
books and articles published, and key administrative or consulting positions held by the
signers. Id.
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After noting in this comment letter that ESG-based investing has
outperformed benchmarks, economist Lukomnik explains his worry that the
2020 Proposed Rule would endanger retirement security.104
A 2020 meta-study examined more than one thousand research papers
from 2015 to 2020, dividing the articles between those focused on corporate
financial performance and those focused on investment performance.105 For
the corporate studies, the authors reported the relationship between ESG
and financial performance to be positive for 58%, neutral for 13%, mixed
for 21%, and negative for 8%.106 For the investment studies, 59% showed
performance similar to or better than conventional investment approaches,
and 14% showed negative results.107 The authors concluded that
“[i]mproved financial performance due to ESG becomes more marked over
longer time horizons” and that “ESG integration, broadly speaking as an
investment strategy, seems to perform better than negative screening
approaches.”108
One challenge in using ESG information is that the reporting by
companies has not been consistent or thorough. The Global Reporting
Initiative (“GRI”), created in 1997, issued a global sustainability reporting
framework in 2000 and has continued to update the guidelines.109 The
Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (“SASB”) developed a set of
seventy-seven industry-specific standards and published the final version in
2018.110 The standards focus on financial materiality, with the goal of
making the information more accessible to investors.111 In June 2021, the
SASB merged with the International Integrated Reporting Council
(“IIRC”)112 to become the Value Reporting Foundation.113 The Value
104. Id.
105. WHELAN ET AL., supra note 98, at 2.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 3.
109. See Gary, Best Interests in the Long Term, supra note 69, at 773–74, 733 n.192
(describing the history of GRI and development of the GRI Standards).
110. Id. at 772–73.
111. Id.
112. The IIRC developed an integrated reporting framework organized around six types
of capital: financial, manufacture, intellectual, human, social and relationship, and natural.
Id. at 775.
113. IIRC and SASB Form the Value Reporting Foundation, Providing Comprehensive
Suite of Tools to Assess, Manage and Communicate Value, GLOBENEWSWIRE (June 9, 2021,
9:30 AM ET), https://www.globenewswire.com/en/news-release/2021/06/09/2244505/0/en/
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Reporting Foundation combines the SASB standards with the Integrated
Reporting Framework developed by the IIRC, with the goal of providing “a
more complete picture of long-term value creation while meeting investor
needs for comparable, consistent, and reliable information.”114
The SEC requires reporting of any financially material information115
and is working on improving disclosures related to ESG investing.116 SEC
Chair Gary Gensler has said that “in his view not only do investors want
this information, but also that issuers would benefit from ‘such
guidance.’”117 In addition to providing material information, a concern is
that disclosure be accurate.118 Terms like “green” and “sustainable” do not
have standardized meanings, and Gensler asked SEC staff to consider
whether to require disclosures that would provide information about the
criteria and data used to create a fund.119
IIRC-and-SASB-form-the-Value-Reporting-Foundation-providing-comprehensive-suite-oftools-to-assess-manage-and-communicate-value.html.
114. VALUE REPORTING FOUND., https://www.valuereportingfoundation.org/ (last visited
June 1, 2022).
115. See generally SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 17 C.F.R. pt. 211 (Aug. 12,
1999).
116. See Andrew Ramonas, SEC’s Gensler Eyes ESG Reporting Rules After Public Input,
BLOOMBERG L. (May 6, 2021, 3:23 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/securities-law/
secs-gensler-eyes-esg-reporting-rules-after-public-input; Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n, SEC Proposes to Enhance Disclosures by Certain Investment Advisers and
Investment Companies About ESG Investment Practices (May 25, 2022), https://www.
sec.gov/news/press-release/2022-92 [hereinafter Press Release, SEC Proposes to Enhance
Disclosures]. In March 2021, the SEC announced the creation of a Climate and ESG Task
Force in the Division of Enforcement “to identify any material gaps or misstatements in
issuers’ disclosure of climate risks under existing rules.” Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n, SEC Announces Enforcement Task Force Focused on Climate and ESG Issues
(Mar. 4, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2021-42.
117. Betty Moy Huber et al., Gensler and SEC’s 2021 Examination Priorities Highlight
ESG and Climate Risk, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Mar. 20, 2021),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2021/03/20/gensler-and-secs-2021-examination-prioritieshighlight-esg-and-climate-risk/.
118. See Curtis, Fisch & Robertson, supra note 2 (reporting the results of their extensive
empirical examination of ESG mutual funds). The Curtis et al. study found that “contrary to
the SEC’s concern about ‘greenwashing,’ ESG funds deliver on their promise to invest
differently from other funds, and their holdings are rated more highly with respect to ESG.”
Id. at 399. The study also examined proxy voting and found “clear differences between the
voting behavior of ESG and non-ESG funds.” Id.
119. Gary Gensler, Chair Gensler’s Remarks at the Asset Management Advisory
Committee Meeting, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (July 11, 2021), https://corp
gov.law.harvard.edu/2021/07/11/chair-genslers-remarks-at-the-asset-management-advisory-
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In May 2022, the SEC issued proposed amendments to rules and
disclosure forms to improve reporting by investment companies and
advisors that use ESG strategies.120 The proposal requires specific
disclosures in fund prospectuses, annual reports, and advisor brochures.121
The proposal creates categories of ESG strategies and then applies different
requirements to each category.122 Funds that integrate ESG factors with
other factors would be required to describe how they incorporate ESG
factors into the investment process.123 ESG-focused funds would be
required to provide details about how they use the ESG factors and to
provide a standardized ESG strategy overview table, making comparisons
with other funds easier.124 Funds that seek a particular ESG impact would
be required to disclose how the fund measures progress.125 Funds that use
proxy voting in connection with ESG goals would need to provide
information about their proxy voting strategy or other engagement with
issuers.126 Finally, any ESG-focused fund that considers environmental
factors would need to disclose the greenhouse gas emissions associated
with the investments, as a way of providing the carbon footprint and
weighted average carbon intensity of their portfolio.127
The SEC will consider public comments before issuing final
amendments, but some amendments to the disclosure requirements seem
likely. With increased attention to disclosure of ESG information, investors
will have better information and fiduciaries will need to pay more attention
to the disclosures.
committee-meeting/ (“I think updates to fund disclosures and to naming conventions could
bring needed transparency to the asset management industry, particularly in light of the
significant growth in the sustainability area. This gets to the heart of the SEC’s mission to
protect investors and efficiently allocate capital.”).
120. Press Release, SEC Proposes to Enhance Disclosures, supra note 116. The SEC had
earlier issued a proposed rule on climate-related disclosure. The Enhancement and
Standardization of Climate-Related Disclosures for Investors, 87 Fed. Reg. 21334 (Apr. 11,
2022) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 229, 232, 239, 249).
121. Enhanced Disclosures by Certain Investment Advisers and Investment Companies
About Environmental, Social, and Governance Investment Practices, 87 Fed. Reg. 36654
(June 17, 2022) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 230, 232, 239, 249, 274, 279).
122. Id. at 36657. The proposal names the strategies ESG Integration, ESG-Focused, and
ESG Impact. Id.
123. Id. at 36660–62.
124. Id. at 36662–68.
125. Id. at 36668–69.
126. Id. at 36669–71.
127. Id. at 36676–85.
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IV. DOL Guidance Regarding the Use of ESG Factors
The DOL provides guidance to pension fiduciaries governed by ERISA,
including guidance focused on fiduciary investing. A quick review of
guidance issued in 1994, 2008, and 2015 reveals two things: the guidance
shifts slightly depending on the administration in power, and the underlying
fiduciary duties remain unchanged.128 With the changes in guidance,
pension managers are left trying to figure out what types of investment
strategies are acceptable and without risk to the fiduciaries. A knee-jerk
reaction might be to avoid anything with a whiff of “social investing,”129
but given that material ESG factors can identify financial risks, simply
avoiding any strategies that use ESG factors is increasingly problematic.130
Further, it appears that many analysts use material ESG factors without
identifying their managed funds as “ESG funds” by name or otherwise.131
Avoidance of funds that use ESG factors in analysis may require a great
deal of investigation and associated costs. A prudent investor should
consider material financial factors, and some ESG factors fall within that
category.132 The question for managers is what they may consider and what
128. See generally Interpretive Bulletin Relating to the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974, 59 Fed. Reg. 32606 (June 23, 1994) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 2509.941) (I.B. 94-1); Interpretive Bulletin Relating to Investing in Economically Targeted
Investments, 73 Fed. Reg. 61734 (Oct. 17, 2008) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 2509.08-01) (I.B.
2008-01) (superseding I.B. 94-1); Interpretive Bulletin Relating to the Fiduciary Standard
Under ERISA in Considering Economically Targeted Investments, 80 Fed. Reg. 65135 (Oct.
26, 2015) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 2509.2015-01) (I.B. 2015-1) (replacing I.B. 2008-01 to
reinstate the language of I.B. 94-1).
129. Curtis, Fisch & Robertson, supra note 2, at 418 (“[P]lan sponsors might be
sufficiently risk averse, particularly in light of the threat of private litigation, to avoid funds
that foreground ESG goals.”).
130. See Final ERISA Rules Circle Back to Allow ESG Investing, supra note 6 (“The
deluge of mainstream investor comments on the proposed rule citing recent favorable
research findings that support integration of material ESG considerations, as well as the
DOL’s apparent realization that many of its initial assumptions underlying the proposed rule
were outdated, might be seen as raising a yellow flag for investor fiduciaries.”).
131. See Robert G. Eccles et al., Market Interest in Nonfinancial Information, J. APPLIED
CORP. FIN., Fall 2011, at 113, 120–24 (finding a high level of market interest in ESG
disclosure, based on an analysis of “hits” accessing nonfinancial metrics in the Bloomberg
database).
132. See Lukomnik, supra note 66 (“[A]cademicians believe ESG is economically
material, regulators in other jurisdictions believe ESG to be economically material, and some
$40 trillion already is managed with ESG considerations, which is a material subset of the
entire global capital market.”).
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they should consider. This section reviews earlier guidance and then
examines the 2020 Rule and the 2021 Proposed Rule.
A. IB 94-1
In 1994, the DOL issued Interpretive Bulletin 94-1 to clarify that
investments that were selected for collateral (e.g., social or environmental)
benefits, as well as financial return, were acceptable, so long as the
financial returns on a risk-adjusted basis were comparable to the expected
risk-adjusted returns of other investments available to the pension plan.133
IB 94-1 focused on economically targeted investments (“ETIs”),
investments “designed to produce competitive . . . return[s]” while creating
“collateral economic benefits.”134 The guidance stated that plan assets could
not be used to promote public policy interests at the expense of the financial
interests of the plan’s beneficiaries and that fiduciaries should not accept
lower expected financial returns in order to accomplish or consider nonfinancial goals.135
B. IB 2008-01
In 2008, the DOL replaced IB 94-1 with Interpretive Bulletin 2008-01.136
The new guidance said that it did not alter the basic legal principles of IB
94-1,137 but it apparently intended to discourage socially responsible
investing. IB 2008-01 stated that consideration of collateral, non-economic
factors in investment decision-making should be rare and well
documented.138 IB 94-1 and IB 2008-01 refer respectively to “collateral”139
and “non-economic”140 factors and reflect the view that any non-traditional
133. See Interpretive Bulletin Relating to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974, 59 Fed. Reg. at 32606. The 2015 Bulletin explains that IB 94-1 was issued “to
correct a popular misperception at the time that investments in ETIs are incompatible with
ERISA’s fiduciary obligations.” Interpretive Bulletin Relating to the Fiduciary Standard
Under ERISA in Considering Economically Targeted Investments, 80 Fed. Reg. at 65135.
134. See Lurie, supra note 50, at 316.
135. Interpretive Bulletin Relating to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974, 59 Fed. Reg. at 32606–07.
136. Interpretive Bulletin Relating to Investing in Economically Targeted Investments,
73 Fed. Reg. 61734, 61734 (Oct. 17, 2008) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 2509.08-01).
137. See id.
138. Id.
139. Interpretive Bulletin Relating to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974, 59 Fed. Reg. at 32606.
140. Interpretive Bulletin Relating to Investing in Economically Targeted Investments,
73 Fed. Reg. at 61734.
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factors do not have economic significance. IB 2008-01 resulted in
confusion about how to treat ESG factors that have current or long-term
financial or risk implications.141
C. IB 2015-01
As awareness of the financial materiality of ESG factors grew, the DOL
issued Interpretive Bulletin 2015-01.142 This bulletin, which addresses both
ETIs and ESG investing, removes IB 2008-01, reinstates IB 94-1, and
provides additional guidance.143 IB 2015-01 explains that the DOL had
become concerned “that the 2008 guidance may be dissuading fiduciaries
from (1) pursuing investment strategies that consider environmental, social,
and governance factors, even where they are used solely to evaluate the
economic benefits of investments and identify economically superior
investments, and (2) investing in ETIs even where economically
equivalent.”144
Fiduciaries should consider factors that may affect the risk and return of
investments, and IB 2015-01 reflects the DOL’s recognition that
“[e]nvironmental, social, and governance issues may have a direct
relationship to the economic value of the plan’s investment.”145 The
guidance explains that “[i]n these instances, such issues are not merely
collateral considerations or tie-breakers, but rather are proper components
of the fiduciary’s primary analysis of the economic merits of competing
investment choices.”146 IB 2015-01 clarifies that ERISA fiduciaries may
consider the collateral benefits of ETIs “so long as the investment is
economically equivalent, with respect to return and risk to beneficiaries in
the appropriate time horizon, to investments without such collateral
benefits.”147 The guidance aligns with the duty of loyalty, even if the duty
to act in the beneficiaries’ best interests is limited to financial interests. If
the beneficiaries’ financial interests are not adversely affected, other
interests—collateral benefits—may be considered.

141. Interpretive Bulletin Relating to the Fiduciary Standard Under ERISA in
Considering Economically Targeted Investments, 80 Fed. Reg. 65135, 65136 (Oct. 26,
2015) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 2509.2015-01).
142. Id. at 65135.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 65136.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
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D. 2018 Field Assistance Bulletin
In 2018, the DOL issued a Field Assistance Bulletin providing additional
guidance.148 Referring to the 2015 Bulletin, the guidance says that “the
Department merely recognized that there could be instances when
otherwise collateral ESG issues present material business risk or
opportunities to companies that company officers and directors need to
manage.”149 The 2018 Bulletin then explains that “[i]n such situations, these
ordinarily collateral issues are themselves appropriate economic
considerations, and thus should be considered by a prudent fiduciary along
with other relevant economic factors.”150 The 2018 guidance exemplifies
the back-and-forth as presidential administrations change. The 2015
Bulletin, issued during the Obama administration, reminds fiduciaries that
ESG factors may be financially material but adds that collateral benefits
may be considered as long as the investment does not generate lower
returns or higher risk.151 The 2018 Bulletin, issued during the Trump
administration, also indicates that ESG factors may be relevant economic
factors to consider, but this Bulletin limits the guidance to the factors’
economic relevance and ignores any collateral benefits.152 The overall
guidance is similar: a prudent fiduciary should consider financially material
ESG factors as appropriate for the purposes of the plan.
E. 2020 Rule: Financial Factors in Selecting Plan Investments
The DOL issued a Proposed Rule in June 2020.153 Although the DOL
presented the proposal as necessary to protect the financial interests of
pension plan participants,154 the rationale behind the proposal may have
148. Emp. Benefits Sec. Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Field Assistance Bull. No. 201801, Interpretive Bulletins 2016-01 and 2015-01 (Apr. 23, 2018), https://www.dol.gov/sites/
dolgov/files/ebsa/employers-and-advisers/guidance/field-assistance-bulletins/2018-01.pdf.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. See id.
152. See id.
153. Financial Factors in Selecting Plan Investments, 85 Fed. Reg. 39113 (proposed June
30, 2020).
154. News Release, Emp. Benefits Sec. Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Labor, U.S. Department
of Labor Proposes New Investment Duties Rule (June 23, 2020), https://www.dol.gov/
newsroom/releases/ebsa/ebsa20200623 (quoting Acting Assistant Secretary of Labor for the
Employee Benefits Security Administration Jeanne Klinefelter Wilson) (“Providing further
clarity on fiduciaries’ responsibilities in ESG investing will help safeguard the interests of
participants and beneficiaries.”); Financial Factors in Selecting Plan Investments, 85 Fed.
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been an attempt to shore up the energy sector.155 The proposal was issued in
response to an executive order on “Promoting Energy Infrastructure and
Economic Growth,” which called on the DOL to review information on
ERISA plans to “identify whether there are discernable trends with respect
to such plans’ investments in the energy sector.”156 Notably, the North
American Coal Corporation submitted one of the few letters supporting the
proposed regulations, and in that letter the corporation complained that “the
coal sector is being targeted by environmental, social, and corporate
governance (‘ESG’) activists.”157
The Proposed Rule took direct aim at the growing use of ESG
investing.158 In explaining the purpose of the Proposed Rule, the DOL
stated that “the growing emphasis on ESG investing may be prompting
ERISA plan fiduciaries to make investment decisions for purposes distinct
from providing benefits to participants and beneficiaries and defraying
reasonable expenses of administering the plan.”159 As the public comments
submitted in response to the Proposed Rule pointed out, however, this
statement reflects “a flawed and unsupported assumption that ESG funds

Reg. at 39121 (“The proposed rule would replace existing guidance on the use of ESG and
similar factors in the selection of investments, including that fiduciaries must not base
investment decisions on non-pecuniary factors unless alternative investment options are
‘economically indistinguishable’ and such a conclusion is properly documented.”). The
Proposed Rule does not require that choices of other types of investment strategies (e.g.,
growth, value, passive, active) be “economically indistinguishable” and “properly
documented.” See id.
155. See Letter from Patty Murray et al., U.S. Sens., to Eugene Scalia, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t
of Lab., on Financial Factors in Selecting Plan Investments (RIN 1210-AB95) (July 30,
2020), https://www.help.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/073020%20FINAL%20ESG%20Comm
ent%20Letter1.pdf.
156. Id. at 4.
157. Letter from Rebecca McGrew, Manager of Regul. & Env’t Affs., N. Am. Coal
Corp., to Off. of Regul. & Interpretations, U.S. Dep’t of Lab., on Comments of the North
American Coal Corporation (RIN 1210-AB95) (July 30, 2020), https://www.dol.gov/sites/
dolgov/files/EBSA/laws-and-regulations/rules-and-regulations/public-comments/1210-AB95
/00608.pdf.
158. Describing the need for the new regulation, the DOL says, “Recently, there has been
an increased emphasis in the marketplace on investments and investment courses of action
that further non-pecuniary objectives, particularly what have been termed environmental,
social, and corporate governance (ESG) investing.” Financial Factors in Selecting Plan
Investments, 85 Fed. Reg. at 39120.
159. Id. at 39116.
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give up financial returns in favor of ‘non-pecuniary’ rewards.”160 The DOL
stated its intent “to provide clarity and certainty regarding the scope of
fiduciary duties,”161 but the proposal appeared to be an attempt to chill the
use of any ESG investing by requiring extensive comparative research and
documentation.162
The DOL received what may be a record number of comments for an
ERISA fiduciary regulation, with 1,100 individual comment letters and
7,617 names associated with six petitions.163 Ninety-five percent of the
comments opposed the proposed regulation.164 The Reinhart law firm
summarized the comments objecting to the proposal:
$

Integration of material ESG factors into investment
analysis has become a widely accepted practice of
mainstream investment firms and ESG portfolios have
enjoyed increasing investor cash flows.

$

The DOL ignored the overwhelming majority of recent
research findings from credible sources that

160. US SIF, Investor Organizations and Financial Industry Firms’ Analysis of Public
Comments, supra note 6.
161. Financial Factors in Selecting Plan Investments, 85 Fed. Reg. at 39116.
162. US SIF Releases Statement on Department of Labor Rulemaking Related to ERISA
and ESG Considerations, US SIF (June 24, 2020, 4:43 PM), https://www.ussif.org/blog_
home.asp?display=141 (quoting Lisa Woll, CEO, US SIF) (“The proposal would put a
substantial additional burden on fiduciaries who wish to utilize ESG investments by
requiring additional investment analysis and documentation requirements . . . .”)
(“Generating more hurdles to the incorporation of ESG criteria will have a chilling
effect . . . .”) [hereinafter US SIF Releases Statement].
163. BRADFORD CAMPBELL, NATIXIS INV. MANAGERS, DOL PAVES THE WAY FOR ERISA
PLAN ESG INVESTMENTS IN FINAL “PECUNIARY FACTOR” RULE 1 n.1 (2020), https://www.
intentionalendowments.org/investments_in_final_pecuniary_factor_rule; see also US SIF,
Investor Organizations and Financial Industry Firms’ Analysis of Public Comments, supra
note 6. The DOL noted that “[m]any commenters requested an extension of the comment
period” but that it determined that the record created was “sufficient.” Financial Factors in
Selecting Plan Investments, 85 Fed. Reg. 72846, 72850 (Nov. 13, 2020) (to be codified at 29
C.F.R. pts. 2509, 2550).
164. Final ERISA Rules Circle Back to Allow ESG Investing, supra note 6; see also US
SIF, Investor Organizations and Financial Industry Firms’ Analysis of Public Comments,
supra note 6. The US SIF analysis found that 96% of comments from individuals (8,337
total), 94% of investment-related groups (229 total), and 57% of non-investment-related
firms and organizations (120 total) expressed opposition to the Proposed Rule. Id. Of the
remaining comments, a significant number were mixed or neutral, so the actual number of
comments in support of the Proposed Rule was quite low. See id.
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demonstrated there is no financial penalty associated
with integration of material ESG considerations into
investment analysis and that many ESG investment
approaches have outperformed their peers.
$

By discouraging consideration of ESG issues, the
proposal would harm fund members by requiring ERISA
managers to remain blind to material investment risks
and opportunities.

$

Excluding ESG investment options from defined
contribution plans could result in higher portfolio risk
exposures and lower returns for pension plan members.

$

Singling out ESG for disparate treatment is inappropriate
and inconsistent with ERISA.165

In general, the comments pointed out that imposing administrative
burdens on investment strategies that incorporate ESG factors could result
in higher risk exposures and lower returns, the opposite of what the DOL
claimed to be doing.166 Further, the proposal focused on a single investment
category rather than on the financial materiality of all investment
products.167 As Lisa Woll, CEO of US SIF, explained, “[T]he DOL
proposal is out of step with professional investment managers, who
increasingly analyze ESG factors precisely because of risk, return and
fiduciary considerations.”168
When the DOL issued the final rule on November 13, 2020, many of the
documentation aspects of the proposal had been removed.169 The 2020 Rule
emphasizes the long-standing guidance that “an ERISA fiduciary’s
evaluation of plan investments must be focused solely on economic
considerations that have a material effect on the risk and return of an
investment based on appropriate investment horizons, consistent with the

165. Final ERISA Rules Circle Back to Allow ESG Investing, supra note 6.
166. In response to the Proposed Rule, Ceres CEO and President Mindy Lubber said, “As
the comment letters confirm, ESG risks are often systemic risks that pose short, medium and
long term financial risks to investment portfolios.” US SIF, Investor Organizations and
Financial Industry Firms’ Analysis of Public Comments, supra note 6.
167. See supra note 154.
168. US SIF Releases Statement, supra note 162.
169. See Financial Factors in Selecting Plan Investments, 85 Fed. Reg. 72846 (Nov. 13,
2020) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 2509, 2550).
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plan’s funding policy and investment policy objectives.”170 The 2020 Rule
adopts the term “pecuniary factors” to avoid the terminology challenges
associated with ESG.171
With respect to defined contribution (“DC”) plans, the 2020 Rule
impliedly accepts the notion that the “interests” of plan participants may
include more than financial interests. As long as inclusion of an investment
alternative for DC plan participants is based on an evaluation of pecuniary
factors, the fiduciary is not precluded from considering an investment fund
“merely because the fund, product, or model portfolio promotes, seeks, or
supports one or more non-pecuniary goals.”172 The 2020 Rule reflects a
commonsense understanding of ESG factors. An investor may seek both
financial and non-financial benefits from an investment, as long as the
financial benefits can be obtained without a financial concession related to
the non-financial goals.173 The problem, however, with the 2020 Rule’s
formulation of this “tie-breaker rule” is that the fiduciary must consider the
funds indistinguishable from a financial perspective. Then, if the fiduciary
chooses one fund over another based on collateral benefits, the fiduciary
must document the analysis that led to that decision.174 This documentation
requirement may chill consideration of climate change and other ESG
factors, even if those factors are financially material.175
The rules for qualified default investment alternatives (“QDIAs”) are
more restrictive. The DOL explains that “[p]aragraph (d)(2)(ii) of the final
170. Id. at 72848 (describing the purpose of the regulatory action).
171. Id. at 72858 (explaining the imprecision and ambiguity of the term “ESG”).
172. Id. at 72851.
173. Id. at 72846.
174. Id. at 72884. Subsection 2550.404a-1(c)(2) of the 2020 Rule says that if “the plan
fiduciary is unable to distinguish on the basis of pecuniary factors alone, the fiduciary may
use non-pecuniary factors as the deciding factor.” Id. Then if the fiduciary uses nonpecuniary factors in making an investment decision, the fiduciary must document (i) why the
investment decision could not be made based solely on pecuniary factors, (ii) how the
selected investment compares to alternatives, and (iii) how the non-pecuniary factors used in
making the decisions are consistent with the interests of the plan participants. Id.
175. Prudence and Loyalty in Selecting Plan Investments and Exercising Shareholder
Rights, 86 Fed. Reg. 57272, 57275 (Oct. 14, 2021) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R pt. 2550)
(“The Department has also heard from stakeholders that the current regulation, and investor
confusion about it, including whether climate change and other ESG factors may be treated
as ‘pecuniary’ factors under the regulation, has already had a chilling effect on appropriate
integration of climate change and other ESG factors in investment decisions, which has
continued through the current nonenforcement period, including in circumstances that the
current regulation may in fact allow.”).
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rule expressly provides that in no circumstances may any investment fund,
product, or model portfolio be ‘added as, or as a component of, a qualified
default investment alternative . . . if its investment . . . strategies include,
consider, or indicate the use of one or more non-pecuniary factors.’”176 A
fund can be included as a QDIA if financially material ESG factors are
considered as part of a risk-return analysis, but the fiduciary must document
both the selection and the monitoring of the fund and compare the fund
with similar “conventional” funds.177 The additional burden may have the
effect of limiting the availability of QDIAs that appeal to DC plan
participants who seek both financial and non-financial benefits. The effect
may also be to increase uncompensated systemic risk by limiting the
availability of funds that consider ESG factors, particularly climate change,
to reduce risk.178
F. The Biden Administration’s Initial Steps
The new regulation was created and finalized in a hurry, with only thirty
days for comments and an effective date just a week before the inauguration
of a new U.S. President.179 On inauguration day, January 20, 2021,
President Joe Biden issued an executive order instructing agencies to
review rules and executive orders that could harm public health or the
environment.180 The DOL’s 2020 Rule was on the List of Agency Actions

176. Financial Factors in Selecting Plan Investments, 85 Fed. Reg. 72846, 72865 (Nov.
13, 2020) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 2509, 2550).
177. Id. at 72865–66.
178. As Mindy Lubber explained,
The COVID-19 pandemic has been a devastating reminder of just how quickly
lives and livelihoods can suffer and economies can falter when systemic risks
are ignored. Investors understand climate change is a systemic risk that poses
similar deadly and drastic consequences – including price volatility and asset
value losses – across all sectors critical to our economy.
US SIF, Investor Organizations and Financial Industry Firms’ Analysis of Public
Comments, supra note 6.
179. See Financial Factors in Selecting Plan Investments, 85 Fed. Reg. at 72869, 72850
(establishing an effective date of January 12, 2021); Watch Full Video: Biden Is Inaugurated
as the 46th U.S. President, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/video/us/
politics/100000007558606/biden-inauguration-video.html (providing live coverage of
President Biden’s inauguration on January 20, 2021).
180. Exec. Order No. 13,390, 86 Fed. Reg. 7037 (Jan. 20, 2021).
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for Review.181 On March 10, shortly before Marty Walsh was confirmed as
Secretary of the Department of Labor,182 the DOL issued an enforcement
statement, announcing that the DOL would not enforce the final rule and
would revisit the rule and publish additional guidance.183 Critics of the 2020
Rule shared their thanks for this step, noting that the 2020 Rule had
“ignored the large body of evidence that environmental, social and
governance considerations and proxy voting are suitable for ERISAgoverned retirement plans.”184 As Senator Patty Murray (D-WA), who
serves as Chair of the Senate Health, Education, Labor and Pensions
Committee, said in a statement, “Financial security is about planning for the
long term, and the Trump Administration’s requirement that people doing
that ignore environmental, social, and governance criteria made about as
much sense as telling someone planning a trip they can’t look at a map.”185
On May 20, 2021, President Biden signed Executive Order 14030,
“Climate-Related Financial Risk.”186 The order recognizes the risk climate
change presents to assets, investments, and companies in the United States
and globally. The order describes the government’s policy of advancing
“accurate disclosure of climate-related financial risk” so that government
agencies can act to mitigate the risk.187 The order reaches across many
181. Fact Sheet: List of Agency Actions for Review, WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 20, 2021),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/01/20/fact-sheet-listof-agency-actions-for-review/.
182. Walsh was confirmed on March 22, 2021. News Release, U.S. Dep’t of Lab.,
Statement by Marty J. Walsh Following Senate Confirmation of His Appointment as 29th
Secretary of the U.S. Department of Labor (Mar. 22, 2021), https://www.dol.gov/newsroom/
releases/osec/osec20210322.
183. Department of Labor Statement Regarding Enforcement of Its Final Rules, supra
note 9. Walsh had indicated that he would prioritize a review of the regulation if the Senate
confirmed his nomination. Mark Schoeff, Jr., DOL Nominee Walsh Raises Concerns About
Trump Rule Curbing ESG Retirement Investing, INVESTMENTNEWS (Feb. 24, 2021), https://
www.investmentnews.com/dol-nominee-walsh-raises-concerns-about-trump-rule-curbingesg-retirement-investing-203183.
184. DOL Releases Statement on Non-Enforcement of Two Rules Pertaining to ESG and
Proxy Voting in ERISA Plans, US SIF (Mar. 10, 2021, 7:37 AM), https://www.ussif.org/
blog_home.asp?Display=162.
185. Press Release, U.S. S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Lab. & Pensions, Murray Praises
Biden Administration Move Not to Enforce Restrictions on Socially-Conscious Investing,
Proxy Voting (Mar. 10, 2021), https://www.help.senate.gov/chair/newsroom/press/murraypraises-biden-administration-move-not-to-enforce-restrictions-on-socially_conscious-invest
ing-proxy-voting.
186. Exec. Order No. 14,030, 86 Fed. Reg. 27967 (May 20, 2021).
187. Id. at 27967.
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government agencies, including the DOL. The Secretary of Labor is
directed to identify actions that can be taken “to protect the life savings and
pensions of United States workers and families from the threats of climaterelated financial risk” and to consider “suspend[ing], revis[ing], or
rescind[ing]” the 2020 Rule.188 The Secretary must, within 180 days, report
on the actions taken by the DOL.189 The order makes clear the shift in
perspective between the Trump and Biden administrations, and it reflects a
recognition of the weight of financial evidence related to the need to
consider climate risk to protect investments, especially retirement
investments with a long-term time horizon.
G. The 2021 Proposed Rule: Prudence and Loyalty in Selecting Plan
Investments and Exercising Shareholder Rights
In October 2021, the DOL proposed changes to address confusion the
2020 Rule may have caused, including a perceived chilling effect that may
have influenced consideration of climate change and other ESG factors
even when financially material.190 The DOL expressed concern that
uncertainty over the 2020 Rule may have deterred pension fiduciaries from
taking steps other investors would take to enhance investment performance
or improve portfolio resilience against potential financial risks.191 The DOL
stated its belief that the 2021 Proposed Rule would “improve the current
regulation and further promote retirement income security and further
retirement savings.”192
The 2021 Proposed Rule emphasizes the fiduciary duty of loyalty owed
to plan participants: the fiduciaries “may not sacrifice investment return or
take on additional investment risk to promote goals unrelated to the plan
and its participants and beneficiaries.”193 The proposal clarifies that
“material climate change and other ESG factors are no different than other
‘traditional’ material risk-return factors.”194 If a fiduciary concludes that
climate change or another factor is material to an investment decision,
188. Id. at 27968–69. The order also requires the Secretary to assess “how the Federal
Retirement Thrift Investment Board has taken environmental, social, and governance
factors, including climate-related financial risk, into account.” Id. at 27969.
189. Id. at 27969.
190. Prudence and Loyalty in Selecting Plan Investments and Exercising Shareholder
Rights, 86 Fed. Reg. 57272, 57275 (Oct. 14, 2021) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R pt. 2550).
191. Id.
192. Id. at 57276.
193. Id. at 57278.
194. Id. at 57277.
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whether an individual investment or a course of action, the fiduciary “can
and should consider it and act accordingly, as would be the case with
respect to any material risk-return factor.”195
The 2021 Proposed Rule returns to the tie-breaker concept first
articulated in IB 94-1 and rescinds the tie-breaker rule included in the 2020
Rule.196 One concern with the latter is that it requires that investments be
“indistinguishable” in terms of risk and return.197 The DOL explains that a
better approach is to consider whether the investments “equally serve the
financial interests of the plan.”198 If they do, then collateral benefits can also
be considered and can be determinative. The 2021 Proposed Rule also
removes the requirement that the fiduciary document the analysis for a
decision in which collateral benefits are considered.199
The 2020 Rule imposed restrictions on QDIAs, preventing a fund from
being a QDIA if the fund used non-pecuniary factors in its objectives, even
if the fund is economically prudent.200 The 2021 Proposed Rule removes
the restrictions.201 QDIAs continue to be subject to the rules emphasizing
the financial interests of participants that apply to all pension
investments.202
The comment period for the 2021 Proposed Rule ended on December 13,
2021, with 895 comments received.203 Some comment letters supported the
Proposed Rule, some pushed the DOL to adjust it, and some simply
opposed it altogether. The letters opposing the rule reflect
misunderstandings of how financial analysts use ESG information and what
the 2021 Proposed Rule provides. These letters in opposition range from
individuals commenting “stop taking hard working American’s [sic]

195. Id.
196. Id. at 57278.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 57279.
200. See supra Section IV.E.
201. Prudence and Loyalty in Selecting Plan Investments and Exercising Shareholder
Rights, 86 Fed. Reg. at 57279.
202. Id. at 57280.
203. See Prudence and Loyalty in Selecting Plan Investments and Exercising
Shareholder Rights - Proposed Rule, U.S. DEP’T LAB., https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsa/
laws-and-regulations/rules-and-regulations/public-comments/1210-AC03 (last visited June
10, 2022).
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money”204 to a comment submitted by the State of Utah (“Utah letter”) and
signed by attorneys general and other state officials from twenty-three
states.205 The Utah letter complains that the 2021 Proposed Rule
“encourages, and may in fact require, a plan fiduciary to consider and
prioritize non-pecuniary ESG factors when making investment decisions for
retirement savings accounts. In other words, the Proposed Rule would allow
employers and investment managers to invest employee retirement savings
in a way that benefits social causes and corporate goals even if it adversely
affects the return to the employee.”206
In support of its statement, the Utah letter cites a provision in the
Proposed Rule that a fiduciary may select investments “in part, for benefits
apart from the investment return”207 but fails to add that the Proposed Rule
states that fiduciaries “may not sacrifice investment return or take on
additional investment risk to promote goals unrelated to the plan and its
204. Chuck Zupan, Comment on Prudence and Loyalty in Selecting Plan Investments
and Exercising Shareholder Rights (Dec. 7, 2021), https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/
EBSA/laws-and-regulations/rules-and-regulations/public-comments/1210-AC03/00523.pdf.
Other letters said things like:
“Leave our retirement alone.” Greg McNeil, Comment on Prudence and Loyalty in
Selecting Plan Investments and Exercising Shareholder Rights (Dec. 7, 2021), https://www.
dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/EBSA/laws-and-regulations/rules-and-regulations/publiccommen
ts/1210-AC03/00366.pdf.
“Government should not promote funding for climate change. Let the market do what the
market do.” Jamal Khan, Comment on Prudence and Loyalty in Selecting Plan Investments
and Exercising Shareholder Rights (Nov. 10, 2021), https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/
files/EBSA/laws-and-regulations/rules-and-regulations/public-comments/1210-AC03/00039.
pdf.
“I do not want my hard earned money directed to government directed woke companies.
It is my money and I get to choose how that money is invested, keep your hands off of it.”
Jeffrey Kilgariff, Comment on Prudence and Loyalty in Selecting Plan Investments and
Exercising Shareholder Rights (Dec. 7, 2021), https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/EBSA/
laws-and-regulations/rules-and-regulations/public-comments/1210-AC03/00353.pdf.
205. Off. of the Utah Att’y Gen., Comment Letter on Prudence and Loyalty in Selecting
Plan Investments and Exercising Shareholder Rights (Dec. 13, 2021), https://www.dol.gov/
sites/dolgov/files/EBSA/laws-and-regulations/rules-and-regulations/public-comments/1210AC03/00794.pdf. Officials from the following states signed the letter: Alabama, Alaska,
Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, and West Virginia. Id. at 11–12.
206. Id. at 1.
207. Id. (citing Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 86 Fed. Reg. 57272, 57272 (Oct. 14,
2021)).
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participants and beneficiaries.”208 As explained earlier in this section, the
2021 Proposed Rule continues to emphasize the duty of loyalty to the
financial interests of pension participants and directs fiduciaries to consider
financially material information.209 The changes address a fiduciary concern
that consideration of financially material ESG information is somehow
prohibited.
Comment letters in favor of the 2021 Proposed Rule support changes
that move the guidance “closer to a principles-based approach that does not
uniquely target or single out (positively or negatively) ESG as compared to
any other investment strategies, asset classes, or investment styles.”210
These letters agree with the 2021 Proposed Rule’s focus on a fiduciary’s
duty to consider financially material information, in compliance with the
duties of loyalty and prudence.211 Some letters recommend removing
examples that are ESG specific and removing the tie-breaker provision.212
The comment letter submitted by Northern Trust explains that the inclusion
of ESG-specific examples “differentiates ESG considerations from broad
investment considerations. The neutral application of fiduciary principles
and risks should not create a distinction between ESG considerations and
208. Prudence and Loyalty in Selecting Plan Investments and Exercising Shareholder
Rights, 86 Fed. Reg. 57272, 57278 (Oct. 14, 2021) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R pt. 2550).
209. See supra text accompanying notes 193–95.
210. Lew Minsky, President & CEO, Defined Contribution Institutional Inv. Ass’n,
Comment Letter on Prudence and Loyalty in Selecting Plan Investments and Exercising
Shareholder Rights (Dec. 9, 2021), https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/EBSA/laws-andregulations/rules-and-regulations/public-comments/1210-AC03/00324.pdf [hereinafter DCIIA
Letter]; see also Julie Moret & Shundrawn Thomas, N. Tr. Asset Mgmt., Comment Letter on
Prudence and Loyalty in Selecting Plan Investments and Exercising Shareholder Rights (Dec.
13, 2021), https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/EBSA/laws-and-regulations/rules-and-regula
tions/public-comments/1210-AC03/00769.pdf [hereinafter Northern Letter] (“[P]lan fiduciaries
should have the ability to consider material ESG risks and opportunities . . . in a manner that is
consistent with their duties of loyalty and prudence . . . . Investors can integrate ESG data to
create a more holistic view of risks and opportunities, resulting in more informed investment
decisions and resilient portfolios.”).
211. See, e.g., DCIIA Letter, supra note 210 (agreeing with DOL’s attempt, through the
2021 Proposed Rule, “to remove barriers that may prevent the prudent integration of ESG
factors into ERISA fiduciary decision-making”).
212. Phoebe Papageorgiou & Timothy E. Keehan, Vice Presidents, Am. Bankers Ass’n,
Comment Letter on Prudence and Loyalty in Selecting Plan Investments and Exercising
Shareholder Rights (Dec. 13, 2021), https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/EBSA/laws-andregulations/rules-and-regulations/public-comments/1210-AC03/00713.pdf (recommending
removal of ESG-specific examples to avoid prejudice to factors not on the list and to avoid
the need to update the list).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol74/iss4/5

2022]

PENSION FIDUCIARIES IN THE ESG ENVIRONMENT

641

other investment and financial considerations as drawing a distinction here
may create undue confusion and potentially invite litigation.”213 The tiebreaker rule is described as “obsolete,”214 and letters express the concern
that the record-keeping required by the tie-breaker rule adds costs to the
plans and therefore to their participants.215
Finally, the comment letter filed by the Intentional Endowments
Network216 recommends that the 2021 Proposed Rule address the duty of
impartiality and recommends presumptive use of longer investment time
horizons.217 As described earlier,218 fiduciaries for pension plans must
consider the needs of already-retired participants and the needs of
participants who will retire in the future. Guidance should directly address
the duty of impartiality and the issue of longer time horizons. As the
Teamsters’ comment letter notes, “There are sound reasons for allowing
fiduciaries to consider ESG factors, which can have a direct effect on the
long-term health of a plan’s assets.”219

213. Northern Letter, supra note 210. See generally Chantel Sheaks, Vice President of
Ret. Pol’y, U.S. Chamber of Com., Comment Letter on Prudence and Loyalty in Selecting
Plan Investments and Exercising Shareholder Rights (Dec. 10, 2021), https://www.dol.gov/
sites/dolgov/files/EBSA/laws-and-regulations/rules-and-regulations/public-comments/1210AC03/00316.pdf (recommending removal of examples both because there are numerous
other factors that fiduciaries should consider and because the list might suggest that the DOL
expects fiduciaries to consider these factors, even when not prudent or possible).
214. Northern Letter, supra note 210 (“Provided that a fiduciary is guided by their duty
of prudence, a criterion for defining a ‘tie breaker’ should be obsolete.”).
215. Id.; see also DCIIA Letter, supra note 210.
216. The author participated in the drafting of this letter.
217. Keith Johnson et al., Intentional Endowments Network, Comment Letter on
Prudence and Loyalty in Selecting Plan Investments and Exercising Shareholder Rights
(Dec. 13, 2021), https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/EBSA/laws-and-regulations/rulesand-regulations/public-comments/1210-AC03/00714.pdf (“[T]he final rule should explicitly
recognize a presumption that a long-term investment horizon will nearly always be an
appropriate primary time horizon (although perhaps not the exclusive time horizon) for an
ERISA fiduciary’s strategic investment decision processes.”).
218. See supra Section II.C.
219. Ken Hall, Gen. Sec’y-Treasurer, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, Comment Letter on
Prudence and Loyalty in Selecting Plan Investments and Exercising Shareholder Rights
(Dec. 10, 2021), https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/EBSA/laws-and-regulations/rulesand-regulations/public-comments/1210-AC03/00318.pdf.
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V. Cautions and Opportunities for Pension Fiduciaries
A. ESG, the Prudent Investor Standard, and the Duty of Loyalty
A question that occasionally surfaces lies at the intersection of the duty
of loyalty and the duty to be a prudent investor. The duty of loyalty and the
exclusive benefit rule both require the fiduciary to make decisions in the
sole interests of the beneficiaries.220 Those interests have been deemed to
mean financial interests,221 but as early as the 1994 guidance, the DOL
recognized that other interests might be considered, as long as the
consideration of those other interests did not result in a cost to the financial
interests.222 That is, investments that accomplished multiple goals were
acceptable, as long as the investments did not accept concessionary returns.
Thus, if the investment’s risk-and-return assessment met the prudent
investor standard, the fiduciary could properly consider collateral benefits
in choosing the investment.223 Alvin Lurie explained that it is unnecessary
to treat consideration of non-financial benefits to plan participants as
“contamination,”224 because the prudent investor standard can continue to
protect pensions from imprudent investments.225
Writing about the 2015 DOL guidance, Edward Zelinsky objected to
consideration of collateral benefits that would benefit third parties.226 He
did not discuss whether a fiduciary could consider non-financial benefits to
the plan participants themselves but rather assumed that any ETIs would
benefit third parties.227 Zelinsky also wrote about the 1994 guidance, and at
that time he objected to the guidance as a step “in the reincarnation of the
discredited theory of industrial policy” that would encourage the use of
pension assets to allocate capital more wisely than the market.228 He
220. See supra Section II.A.
221. See Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. 409, 421 (2014).
222. Interpretive Bulletin Relating to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974, 59 Fed. Reg. 32606, 32606 (June 23, 1994) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 2509.94-1).
223. See Lurie, supra note 50, at 318.
224. Id. at 315.
225. Id. at 329.
226. Edward A. Zelinsky, The Continuing Battle Over Economically Targeted
Investments: An Analysis of the Department of Labor’s Interpretive Bulletin 2015-01, 2016
CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 197, 198.
227. See id. at 202.
228. See Edward A. Zelinsky, ETI, Phone the Department of Labor: Economically
Targeted Investments, IB 94-1 and the Reincarnation of Industrial Policy, 16 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 333, 334 (1995).
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worried that ETIs would be “used to bail out failing industries and to satisfy
constituencies promoting below-market investments.”229 At that time,
Zelinsky thought the guidance was unnecessary because existing DOL
policies on ETIs would “allow collateral benefits to be considered in
making investment decisions where such investments are prudent and
provide a competitive risk-adjusted return.”230
Professors Max Schanzenbach and Robert Sitkoff have argued that any
consideration of collateral benefits taints a determination that an investment
is prudent under the prudent investor rule.231 Because the duty of loyalty
requires a fiduciary to focus on the sole interests of the beneficiaries, they
conclude that investing for combined purposes—financial and nonfinancial—is unacceptable for a pension fiduciary.232 They reach this
conclusion by creating a dichotomy that may exist for some, but certainly
not all, investors. They define “collateral-benefits” ESG investing to mean
“ESG investing for moral or ethical reasons or to benefit a third party”233
and “risk-return” ESG investing to mean investment decisions made solely
for financial reasons.234 Part of the difficulty of Schanzenbach and Sitkoff’s
approach may be that they view collateral-benefits ESG as the use of
negative screens, while their definition of risk-return ESG is closer to the
type of ESG integration described in this Article.235 Many investors who
use ESG integration have both financial and non-financial motives.
A better view is the one articulated in the DOL guidance itself: nonfinancial goals can be considered as long as an investment is prudent under
a financial-only analysis.236 The 1980 article by Langbein and Posner,
229. Id. at 354.
230. Id. at 344.
231. See Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 3, at 385–86 (“ESG investing is
permissible for a trustee of a pension . . . if: (1) the trustee reasonably concludes that the
ESG investment program will benefit the beneficiary directly by improving risk-adjusted
return; and (2) the trustee’s exclusive motive for adopting the ESG investment program is to
obtain this direct benefit.”).
232. See id. at 384–85.
233. Id. at 389–90.
234. Id. at 397.
235. See id. at 398.
236. Interpretive Bulletin Relating to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974, 59 Fed. Reg. 32606, 32606 (June 23, 1994) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 2509.94-1)
(explaining that a plan fiduciary may invest plan assets in an ETI “if the ETI has an expected
rate of return that is commensurate to rates of return of alternative investments”);
Interpretive Bulletin Relating to the Fiduciary Standard Under ERISA in Considering
Economically Targeted Investments, 80 Fed. Reg. 65135, 65136 (Oct. 26, 2015) (codified at
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described above,237 raised concerns about “social investing” and the duty of
loyalty, but the concerns were based on an assumption of greater
transactional costs.238 In their view, social investing was no more
problematic than other actively managed investments.239 The comments to
the Uniform Prudent Investor Act (“UPIA”), written by Langbein as the
Reporter for that uniform act, concur:
No form of so-called “social investing” is consistent with the
duty of loyalty if the investment activity entails sacrificing the
interests of trust beneficiaries–for example, by accepting belowmarket returns–in favor of the interests of the persons
supposedly benefitted by pursuing the particular social cause.240
Section 5 of UPIA states that trust law’s duty of loyalty, the duty to act in
the sole interest of the beneficiary, applies to a fiduciary acting as a prudent
investor.241 The comments quoted above explain that a fiduciary would be
acting counter to the duty of loyalty if the fiduciary intentionally accepted
below-market returns to benefit someone other than the beneficiaries. Thus,
if an investment yields risk-adjusted returns equivalent to those otherwise
obtainable, or if an investment is made to benefit the beneficiaries for
whom the fiduciary is investing,242 the fiduciary complies with the duty of
loyalty.
ESG factors may be financially material and may be considered only as
financial information, but a fiduciary may also use ESG factors in
investment selections with the goal of supporting companies with, for
29 C.F.R. § 2509.2015-01) (permitting ETI investments with collateral benefits “so long as
the investment is economically equivalent . . . to investments without such collateral
benefits”); Financial Factors in Selecting Plan Investments, 85 Fed. Reg. 72846 (Nov. 13,
2020) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 2509, 2550) (“[W]hen making decisions on
investments and investment courses of action, plan fiduciaries must be focused solely on the
plan’s financial returns . . . .”).
237. Langbein & Posner, supra note 71.
238. See id. at 93.
239. Id.
240. UNIF. PRUDENT INV. ACT § 5 cmt. (UNIF. L. COMM’N 1994).
241. Id. § 5 (“A trustee shall invest and manage the trust assets solely in the interest of
the beneficiaries.”).
242. If the fiduciary is investing for a charity, an investment related to the mission of the
charity may comply with the duty of loyalty even if risk-adjusted returns are lower than
comparable investments. See Susan N. Gary, Is It Prudent to Be Responsible? The Legal
Rules for Charities that Engage in Socially Responsible Investing and Mission Investing, 6
NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 106, 123 (2011).
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example, fair labor practices or strong environmental records. Those
companies may generate positive externalities that benefit the pension
participants and their beneficiaries indirectly. An investment in a company
with strong ESG ratings may perform better financially and may also
contribute to climate solutions or other benefits. A pension fiduciary should
not worry that considering non-financial information somehow taints the
investment process. As long as investments are prudent, made in
compliance with the prudent investor standard and the DOL guidance, the
investments will comply with the fiduciary’s duties, including the duty of
loyalty.
For purposes of the fiduciary duty to be a prudent investor, the key is
whether the strategy used results in a necessary cost to the portfolio. An
investor need not be driven purely by financial interests if the investment
strategy does not involve a concessionary return (or higher, uncompensated
risk). Any investment strategy may result in an unforeseen loss, but the
prudent investor standard is not applied in hindsight.243 For purposes of the
prudent investor rule, the question is whether an investment strategy is
entered into with an acceptance of lower financial return or higher risk in
exchange for non-financial benefits.
B. Need to Consider Material Information
ERISA and other pension fiduciaries need to be aware of the role
material ESG factors play in investment performance. With increasing
evidence that these non-traditional factors have financial impacts on risk
and return, attention to these factors becomes a part of a prudent evaluation
of funds and products.244 Documentation of the selection process is
important, both to demonstrate consideration of material factors, including
ESG factors, and to demonstrate the pecuniary basis for selecting a fund or
product.245 Fiduciaries who have been wary of anything labeled ESG due to

243. See UNIF. PRUDENT INV. ACT § 8.
244. See GORDON L. CLARK ET AL., UNIV. OF OXFORD & ARABESQUE PARTNERS, FROM
THE STOCKHOLDER TO THE STAKEHOLDER: HOW SUSTAINABILITY CAN DRIVE FINANCIAL
OUTPERFORMANCE 12 (rev. 2015), https://arabesque.com/research/From_the_stockholder_
to_the_stakeholder_web.pdf.
245. See Final ERISA Rules Circle Back to Allow ESG Investing, supra note 6 (“Based
on this guidance [the 2020 Rule] fiduciaries should proceed cautiously and with formal
documented processes demonstrating their evaluation of pecuniary factors.”). Whether or not
the 2020 Rule is enforced, pension fiduciaries should document the pecuniary reasons for
investment selections.
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an outdated understanding of the pecuniary importance of these facts may
need to reevaluate their selection processes.246
An article in The Asset quoted Mark Konyn, Group Chief Investment
Officer at AIA Group, as saying, “Investors are going to have to be much
more disciplined about understanding the investment impact of changing
values in society.”247 Konyn expressed concern about protecting portfolios
from stranded assets, quoting a BlackRock report stating that “asset owners
may be confronted with asset write-downs (e.g., in the case of fossil-fuel
companies) if they ignore the growing trend [in sustainable investing] for
too long.”248 As the Reinhart law firm explains, “Fiduciaries may want to
consider whether there are new opportunities to capture improved returns or
reduce risk exposures through carefully selected ESG investment
approaches.”249 Pension fiduciaries, like other fiduciaries, need to pay
attention to developments in the investment landscape.
Pension fiduciaries may rely on investment advisors to assist in the
selection of funds and products. The prudent investor standard permits
delegation, but a prudent investor must exercise reasonable care, skill, and
caution in (1) selecting the advisor; (2) establishing the terms of the
delegation, consistent with the purposes of the fund being invested; and (3)
reviewing performance and compliance by the advisor.250
The duty to monitor is ongoing.251 As knowledge about the materiality of
information develops and investment practices evolve, the fiduciary’s
duties include evaluation of the advisors’ expertise in connection with these
changes.252 As part of the monitoring process, pension fiduciaries can
evaluate their investment advisors’ knowledge and expertise in managing
climate risk and other systemic risk.
C. Opportunities for Reducing Risk or Increasing Return
Some financial benefits of integrating ESG factors in investment analysis
lie in the use of information not yet reflected in the market price of stock.
246. See id.
247. Investors Warned of Stranded Assets as ESG Gains Traction, ASSET (Jan. 26, 2021),
https://www.theasset.com/article-esg/42755/theasset.com.
248. Id.
249. Final ERISA Rules Circle Back to Allow ESG Investing, supra note 6.
250. UNIF. PRUDENT INV. ACT § 9 (UNIF. L. COMM’N 1994).
251. Tibble v. Edison Int’l, 575 U.S. 523, 529 (2015).
252. See Final ERISA Rules Circle Back to Allow ESG Investing, supra note 6 (“In
addition, it may be appropriate to evaluate whether the plan’s service providers have both
the needed expertise and contractual duty to provide up-to-date advice on ESG investing.”).
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As the information becomes more widely known, the benefit of this “extra”
information (alpha) will be reduced. In addition, if the benefits of paying
attention to behaviors reflected in E, S, and G information becomes known
in an industry, more companies will adjust their behavior. For example,
resources companies facing public concerns about climate change will
develop strategies for energy transition to sources of energy with reduced
carbon emissions. If improved employee conditions produce strategic
benefits, more companies will improve conditions for their workforces.
Individual comparisons may be less apparent if all companies within a
sector take ESG risks and opportunities seriously.253
The value of considering material ESG factors is not simply in using
information that other investors have not yet incorporated. As ESG
reporting has improved and ESG information has become more widely
available, studies continue to show better or neutral returns when a fund
using ESG integration is compared with a traditional fund.254 Material ESG
information can show a company’s strength, and the stock price may
ultimately reflect some of that information, but ESG information may
suggest uncompensated risk, and the market price may not adjust for that
information. For example, evidence of safety and environmental violations
by British Petroleum (“BP”) existed for two years before the Deepwater
Horizon oil disaster.255 The stock price did not reflect the violations, but an
investor considering material ESG factors would have noted the risk
associated with those violations. When the disaster occurred, the price of
BP stock fell by 50%, and for a five-year period following the oil spill, BP
underperformed a peer group of oil companies by 37%.256 The ESG

253. MARTIN GROSSKOPF, AGF, ESG 2.0 – A POST-COVID-19 ROADMAP FOR THE
EVOLUTION OF ESG 5 (June 26, 2020), https://www.agf.com/_files/pdf/insights/fund120006-20-e-esg-2-0.pdf.
254. See, e.g., Curtis, Fisch & Robertson, supra note 2, at 402 (noting that “an increasing
number of scholars and policymakers claim that sustainable or ESG investing is associated
with better economic performance”); WHELAN ET AL., supra note 98, at 2; Prudence and
Loyalty in Selecting Plan Investments and Exercising Shareholder Rights, 86 Fed. Reg.
57272, 57289–92 (Oct. 14, 2021) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R pt. 2550) (describing studies
analyzing financial risks or higher profitability related to climate change and other ESG
factors).
255. CLARK ET AL., supra note 244, at 14.
256. Id.
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information could have been used to identify a significant, uncompensated
financial risk.257
Some ESG information reflects systemic risk (beta).258 Risks that affect
the market as a whole, such as climate change, political instability, income
inequality, and global financial crisis, may have significant long-term
financial consequences. For example, clean water is a systems-level
issue.259 In the past, companies could use water and then release
contaminated water without financial consequence, externalizing costs
incurred in the production process.260 The cost of cleaning the water was
borne by taxpayers or some other company that needed clean water and
paid to have it cleaned.261 If regulations force companies to internalize the
cost of reducing contamination in water they use and release, the
internalized costs will affect the companies’ bottom lines.262 Systems-level
considerations, such as strategies that consider E, S, and G resources, may
allow an investor to manage systemic risk and improve long-term returns.263
D. Duty of Impartiality and Long-Term Risk
A pension plan serves participants who are currently taking distributions
and those retiring in the future, perhaps decades in the future. In compliance
257. See Raj Thamotheram & Maxime Le Floc’h, The BP Crisis as a “Preventable
Surprise”: Lessons for Institutional Investors, ROTMAN INT’L J. PENSION MGMT., Spring
2012, at 68, 70.
258. Id. at 70–71; LUKOMNIK & HAWLEY, supra note 57, at 32–45 (describing the
importance of systemic risk (beta) in driving investment return).
259. STEVE LYDENBERG, THE INV. INTEGRATION PROJECT, SYSTEMS-LEVEL
CONSIDERATIONS AND THE LONG-TERM INVESTOR: DEFINITIONS, EXAMPLES, AND ACTIONS 2
(2017), https://tiiproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Systems_Level_Considerations_
Long_Term_Investor.pdf [https://perma.cc/4ACW-548U]. Lydenberg, of the Investment
Integration Project, created guidelines for incorporating systems-level considerations into
investment decision-making. Id. at 6–9. He identifies six issues as ones that have substantial
long-term financial implications: climate change, access to fresh water, societal well-being
(poverty alleviation and access to healthcare), human and labor rights, stability and
credibility of markets and financial systems, and transparency of sustainability data. Id. at 9–
17.
260. See Gary, Best Interests in the Long Term, supra note 69, at 782–84 (discussing
externalization of costs).
261. Id. at 782.
262. See id. at 782–84.
263. See Thamotheram & Floc’h, supra note 257, at 68–71 (explaining current problems
with short-term thinking and narrow conception of risk and advocating for greater attention
to systemic risk and “ESG beta”).
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with the duty of impartiality, a pension fiduciary must invest on a long-term
basis to ensure the viability of the fund for those future retirees. 264 ESG
integration is well suited for managing long-term risk. As David Hess
explains, “[T]he ESG movement is less about the values investing
commonly associated with the socially responsible investing (‘SRI’) funds,
and more about long-term value investing focused on reduced risk and
improved shareholder value.”265 Factors associated with climate change,
excessive executive compensation, workforce problems, and human rights
violations may not be reflected in short-term financial metrics but may be
material in evaluating long-term risk.
E. ESG Options May Increase Participation by Millennials
Unrelated to investment performance, a pension plan that offers
investment options that include perceived non-financial as well as financial
benefits may be appealing to millennial employees. Millennials represent a
large demographic, and they are now at the ages (between twenty-six and
forty-one in 2022) when they may be thinking more about planning for
retirement.266 Studies have shown that a significant percentage of
millennials say they want to tailor investments to values or that they are
interested in sustainable investing.267 Providing investment options that
appeal to millennials may encourage them to invest within the pension
framework.268 As Russell Heller, who submitted an individual comment to
the 2021 Proposed Rule, explained, “I find myself trapped between
investing in funds that do not support my values and not saving for
retirement—this is not a choice I should be forced to make. More people
264. See supra Section II.C.
265. David Hess, Public Pensions and the Promise of Shareholder Activism for the Next
Frontier of Corporate Governance: Sustainable Economic Development, 2 VA. L. & BUS.
REV. 221, 223 (2007).
266. See MSCI ESG RSCH. LLC, SWIPE TO INVEST: THE STORY BEHIND MILLENNIALS AND
ESG INVESTING 2 (2020), https://www.msci.com/documents/10199/07e7a7d3-59c3-4d0bb0b5-029e8fd3974b (explaining that Pew Research Center analysis defined millennials as
those born between 1981 and 1996).
267. Id. at 8–10 (listing thirteen studies indicating millennials’ interest in ESG investing);
Julian Seelan, Sustainable Investing: The Millennial Investor, INVS. & WEALTH MONITOR,
Mar./Apr. 2019, at 44, 46, https://investmentsandwealth.org/getattachment/bbdef004-2fe84e71-a445-918a270b5ff7/IWM19MarApr-TheMillennialInvestor.pdf (“86% of millennials
are interested in sustainable investing[.]”).
268. See Goforth, supra note 64 (quoting Edward Farrington, Executive Vice President,
Institutional and Retirement, at Natixis Investment Managers) (“Our research also indicates
ESG investing options can encourage more participation in retirement plans.”).
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will save more towards their retirements if they are given access to funds
that align with their values.”269
VI. For the Future: Should “Benefits” Include Non-Financial Benefits?
The DOL’s 2020 Rule accepts that ESG information has financial
materiality and acknowledges that non-financial benefits can be considered
in choosing funds or products, as long as the actual choice is made for
financial reasons.270 The 2021 Proposed Rule clarifies this position and
removes some of the confusion surrounding the use of financially material
ESG factors.271 As discussed, investment options for QDIA plans are more
restricted under the 2020 Rule,272 but the 2021 Proposed Rule will remove
the restrictions if the rule becomes final.273
A question for the future is whether a fiduciary investing for a
beneficiary’s “interests” must always prioritize financial interests over nonfinancial interests. The question is a difficult one for pension fiduciaries
because pensions operate for large numbers of participants and their
beneficiaries. A determination of non-financial interests is more difficult
than simply trying to invest for the highest possible return with the lowest
risk. Perhaps it is enough to consider the non-financial interests as collateral
and secondary to the financial interests, which is the current state of
fiduciary law. But if, as Lukomnik and Hawley argue, mitigating systemic
risks to financial, social, and environmental systems can create value in the
capital markets and keep the systems functioning in the future,274 then
investing with an eye to those systemic benefits may be appropriate, even
for a fiduciary.
In addition, some individuals and organizations want to be able to invest
in ways that reflect their values. A fiduciary cannot use the fiduciary’s own
values in making determinations for beneficiaries, but if the beneficiaries’
269. Russell Heller, Comment on Prudence and Loyalty in Selecting Plan Investments
and Exercising Shareholder Rights (Nov. 12, 2021), https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/
EBSA/laws-and-regulations/rules-and-regulations/public-comments/1210-AC03/00042.pdf.
270. Financial Factors in Selecting Plan Investments, 85 Fed. Reg. 72846, 72871 (Nov.
13, 2020) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 2509, 2550).
271. See Prudence and Loyalty in Selecting Plan Investments and Exercising Shareholder
Rights, 86 Fed. Reg. 57272, 57278, 57289 (Oct. 14, 2021) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R pt.
2550).
272. See supra text accompanying note 200.
273. See supra text accompanying note 201.
274. See LUKOMNIK & HAWLEY, supra note 57, at 110.
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values are known to the fiduciary, the fiduciary should be able to consider
those values. Both Delaware and Oregon have added provisions to their
prudent investor statutes to permit fiduciaries to do so.275 These statutes
may reflect a growing awareness that for some people, financial return is
not the only return that matters.276
While the Delaware and Oregon statutes make consideration of values
acceptable in the context of a private family trust, consideration of values is
not feasible for a pension, unless the pension is managed for employees of a
single organization with like-minded participants. For example, some
religious organizations want to invest the pensions they manage in a
manner that aligns with their values.277 The 2020 Rule includes a discussion
of several comment letters that raised the issue of investing in alignment
with religious values.278 One commenter worried that the 2020 Proposed
Rule “would have the practical effect of unnecessarily limiting access by
people of faith to prudent pension investment options aligned with their
religious beliefs” and argued that, as proposed, the rule violated the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act.279 Another commenter raised the issue
of religious organizations using negative screens to remove “sin stocks”
from their portfolios.280 After discussing the comments, the 2020 Rule
states that, as revised, the rule provides enough flexibility for a religious
organization to address these concerns.281 In response to the 2020 Rule,
Albert Feuer advocates the adoption of ERISA regulations or other

275. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12 § 3302(a) (2022); OR. REV. STAT. § 130.755(3)(j) (2021).
276. See MSCI ESG RSCH. LLC, supra note 266, at 2 (“The collection of studies . . .
suggested that millennials . . . are interested in directing their investments toward companies
with good ESG records. This reflects a desire for their money not just to earn a return but to
align with their personal values and contribute to the social good.”).
277. Albert Feuer, Ethics, ESG, and ERISA: Ethical-Factor Investing of Savings and
Retirement Benefits, 47 Tax Mgmt. Comp. Plan. J. (BNA) 212, 216 (2019) (describing faithbased investing as the earliest form of what Feuer calls ethical investing). Feuer defines
“ethical-factor investing” as “using ethics as a factor to determine whether to acquire,
dispose of, or how to exercise ownership rights in an equity or debt interest in a business
enterprise.” Id. at 213.
278. Financial Factors in Selecting Plan Investments, 85 Fed. Reg. 72846, 72869 (Nov.
13, 2020) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 2509, 2550).
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 72869–70.
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interpretative guidance that would permit open consideration of ethical
factors.282
VII. Conclusion
As the use of ESG investing by financial analysts has grown, the use of
ESG investing by pension fiduciaries becomes a way to act in line with the
duty to act as a prudent investor when managing pension assets. If a prudent
investor considers financially material information that affects the risk and
return of investments, then a decision to exclude ESG factors because those
factors appear non-traditional is contrary to the prudent investor standard.
At a minimum, consideration of financially material ESG factors is already
part of the fiduciary duty to be a prudent investor.
For now, the DOL has confirmed that fiduciaries may consider material
ESG information.283 The reality, reflected in the comments submitted to the
DOL, is that ESG factors are already part of mainstream investing. The
2020 Rule restricts what can be offered as a QDIA to DC plan participants,
but the 2021 Proposed Rule will remove those restrictions so that
fiduciaries can have more control in deciding how best to serve the people
for whom pensions are provided.284
ESG factors may provide non-financial as well as financial benefits to
plan participants and beneficiaries. For pension fiduciaries, consideration of
material ESG factors for both financial and non-financial reasons is
appropriate and not a violation of the duty of loyalty, as long as the choice
of investments is made for sound financial reasons. The 2021 Proposed
Rule confirms this view of the duties of pension fiduciaries.

282. Albert Feuer, Ethics, Earnings, ERISA, and the Biden Administration, 62 Tax
Mgmt. Memorandum (BNA) 23, 28 (2021).
283. Financial Factors in Selecting Plan Investments, 85 Fed. Reg. at 72871; Prudence
and Loyalty in Selecting Plan Investments and Exercising Shareholder Rights, 86 Fed. Reg.
57272, 57278, 57289 (Oct. 14, 2021) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R pt. 2550).
284. Financial Factors in Selecting Plan Investments, 85 Fed. Reg. at 72864–65;
Prudence and Loyalty in Selecting Plan Investments and Exercising Shareholder Rights, 86
Fed. Reg. at 57278.
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